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INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, the topic of legal recognition for u~married, opposite
sex cohabitants was a cutting-edge issue in the field of family law. The number of
unmarried couples openly living together had increased dramatically during the
2
1
1970s. Social acceptance of unmarried cohabitation was growing. The widely
publicized case of Marvin v. Marvin, 3 decided by the California Supreme Court in
1976, had focused public attention on the legal dimensions of this social phenome
non. At the same time, legal scholars were attempting to determine whether and
how the family law system would recognize unmarried cohabitation as an alterna
tive status to marriage for opposite sex couples. 4 For example, writing in 1981,
Professor Grace Ganz Blumberg commented on the manner in which the law might
develop over time to recognize and regulate a new status for unmarried cohabi
tants. She stated:
[P]iecemeallegislation is probably all that is currently feasible. It
will provide a good basis for more thorough regulation, the need for
which will become increasingly apparent as cohabitation becomes a
settled and unexceptional social institution and as we acquire more
knowledge of the social and economic characteristics of cohabita
tion in the course of administering our first efforts to give it legal
recognition. 5
Two decades later, the American Law Institute [ALI] completed its first major
project in the field of family law, the Principles of the Law ofFamily Dissolution
("Principles,,).6 Chapter 6 of the Principles addressed the rights of unmarried co
habitants at the time of relationship dissolution, proposing significant law reform
by the state legislatures in this area. Specifically, Chapter 6 proposed that qualify
ing unmarried cohabitants should have the same economic rights and obligations
as divorcing spouses under state law at the time of relationship dissolution. The

I See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1128-30 (1981) (discussing census data).
2 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) ("The mores of the society have
indeed changed ... radically in regard to cohabitation ....").
3 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
4 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 1; David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Co
habitation: A Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage, 49 TENN. L. REv. 537
(1981-82); Herma Hill Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L.
REV. 937 (1977); William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights ofUnmarried Cohabitants: A
Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REv. 1677 (1984).
5 Blumberg, supra note 1, at 1180. Professor Blumberg evaluated the merits of enacting
"piecemeal legislation" in the areas of workers' compensation, social security, economic rights be
tween partners upon the termination of their relationship by dissolution or death, public assistance
programs, and federal income taxation. Id. at 1140-70.
6 PRINClPLES OF THE LAW OF F AMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF F AMILY DISSOLUTION].
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publication of Chapter 6 of the Principles triggered a burst of renewed scholarly
attention to the topic of legal recognition for unmarried cohabitants. 7
Notably, little development occurred in the law governing unmarried cohabi
tation between the time of the Marvin case in 1976 and the publication of the ALI
Principles, in spite of the continuing increase in the number of cohabiting couples
8
during this period. Neither the enactment of "piecemeal legislation" nor the more
comprehensive development of a new legal status, contemplated by Professor
Blumberg in 1981, has been realized. The legal system extended little recognition
to opposite sex cohabitants at the time of the Marvin case, and the same is true to
day.
In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court recognized the economic
claims of a woman against her cohabiting partner when their relationship ended, by
applying established contract doctrines and equitable remedies for the first time in
9
this context. The courts in most other states subsequently adopted some version of
the Marvin approach to resolving the economic claims of cohabitants upon rela
tionship dissolution. lO These developments did not, however, establish a new legal
status for unmarried couples based on their de facto family relationships. Rather,
the "Marvin doctrines" in most states simply extended general contract theories
and, in some cases, equitable remedies to define the economic rights of cohabitants
inter se at the time of relationship dissolution. By way of contrast, the ALI pro
posal in Chapter 6 of the Principles would impose status-based rights and duties,
equivalent to those of married couples who divorce, based on the existence of a de
facto family relationship between cohabitants.
Outside of the limited context of relationship dissolution, the subject of un
married cohabitation has received little attention from the courts and legislatures
during the past few decades. The proponents of status recognition for the relation
ships of unmarried cohabitants have highlighted the costs associated with the con
tinuing disregard in the law for this large category of de facto family relation
ships.11 The family law system generally establishes rights and duties for family
members, in fields as diverse as inheritance, creditors' rights, torts, evidence, taxa
tion, and public assistance programs. The purposes of this extensive regulation
include the protection of individual family members, support for the family unit,
and the vindication of various public interests. According to the proponents of re
7 See,

e.g., Symposium, The ALlPrinciples of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYUL.

REv. 857 (2000); Symposium. Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin, 76 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 1261 (2001).
8 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. No. 69, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 62 (2003) (reporting 5,475.768 households headed by unmarried couples out of
a total 105,480,101 U.S. households); Christopher Marquis, Total of Unmarried Couples Surged in
2000 U.S. Census, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,2003, at A22 (citing an increase of seventy-two percent in
the number of households headed by unmarried couples between 1990 and 2000).
9 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 111-23.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 140-45 (describing the development of state law in the
area of cohabitants' rights and duties at the time of relationship dissolution).
II See infra text accompanying notes 170-73 (describing the work of scholars who support le
gal recognition and regulation of the relationships established between unmarried cohabitants).
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form, the continuing exclusion of unmarried cohabitation from the definition of
"family" leaves these important purposes unaccomplished as to many modem
families. 12 This Article explores various reasons why lawmakers have not extended
significant status-based rights and obligations to unmarried, opposite sex cohabi
tants since the decision in Marvin v. Marvin more than a quarter century ago.
In recent years, greater movement has taken place in the law with respect to
same sex couples. Thus, numerous local legislative bodies and a handful of state
legislatures have enacted domestic partnership laws, which generally extend rec
ognition and specified rights and duties to registered partners. Frequently, how
ever, the domestic partnership laws exclude opposite sex couples from their cover
age. 13 A key difference between the two categories of cohabiting couples, which
explains this limitation, is the historical ineligibility of same sex partners to marry.
For them, the recognition of unmarried partnerships in the law serves as a substi
tute for the unavailable status of marriage. By way of contrast, for opposite sex
couples, the creation of an unmarried partnership status establishes a legal alterna
tive to marriage. As described at length in this Article, concerns about the institu
tion of marriage have worked to slow the development of a legal status for unmar
ried, opposite sex couples in the United States. 14
Many forces have shaped the development of the law in this field. First, his
torically, in our Anglo-American tradition, non-marital cohabitation was viewed as
immoral and socially unacceptable. This viewpoint found expression, for example,
in widely enacted state criminal cohabitation statutes. The first Part ofthis Article
focuses on the criminal regulation of unmarried cohabitation, highlighting its pre
sent day ramifications for unmarried couples.
The criminal law discussion in Part I first reviews the unsuccessful legislative
effort in 2003 to repeal the North Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute. Next, a
parallel is drawn between the recent debate in North Dakota and an earlier discus
sion about including unlawful cohabitation as a criminal offense in the Model Pe
nal Code of 1962. In both of these debates, the critics of criminal regulation em
phasized, inter alia, the widespread nonenforcement of existing unlawful cohabita
tion statutes. Thus, Part I further explores the issue of direct enforcement of the
12 See

id.
See infra text accompanying notes 149-57 (describing domestic partnership laws).
14]n May of2004, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same sex marriage, under a
mandate from the state supreme court. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (establishing the May 2004 deadline for same sex marriage recognition). If marriage
for same sex couples becomes widely available in the United States, the current justification for
many same-sex-only domestic partnership laws, described in the text, will be thrown into question.
Other nations have confronted the same issues involving the recognition of unmarried cohabi
tation as a legal family status involving defined rights and duties. As in the United States, greater
recognition has often been extended to same sex couples, compared to opposite sex couples, under
the resulting domestic partnership doctrines worldwide. See Countries That Recognise or Proposed
to Recognise Same-Sex Relationships, at http://www.stonewall.org.uk (last visited July 8, 2004)
[hereinafter Countries That Recognise] (listing jurisdictions worldwide with domestic partnership
laws. indicating whether opposite sex couples are induded, and summarizing the benefits and duties
associated with partnership status).
13
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unlawful cohabitation laws within the modem criminal justice system. Part I then
concludes with an analysis of the present day phenomenon of indirect enforce
ment, whereby noncriminal sanctions are imposed on cohabitants in a variety of
legal settings, based on their violation of state unlawful cohabitation statutes.
These settings include employment, child custody, and income taxation.
Notably, state lawmakers have repealed the criminal cohabitation statutes in
all but a handful of states, and the constitutional validity of the remaining regula
tions is highly questionable. 15 In the modern context, the matter of family status
recognition for cohabiting couples, discussed next in Part IT, is the more significant
issue. Still, the criminal regulation of unmarried cohabitation, and the perception of
immorality and unacceptability embodied therein, remains the backdrop against
which the matter of family status recognition must be understood.
Part IT of this Article begins by summarizing the current state of the law re
garding status recognition for opposite sex cohabitants. Briefly stated, cohabiting
couples receive limited recognition under Marvin-related doctrines, domestic part
nership laws, and occasional statutes and judicial opinions assigning a specific
right or duty to the cohabiting relationship. The remainder of Part II explores rea
sons for the widespread failure to recognize and regulate unmarried cohabitants,
reflected in this summary of current law.
The primary reason for the limited development of status recognition for co
habitants involves a set of policy considerations relating to the institution of mar
riage. The analysis here begins with the widely accepted premise that marriage is a
highly regarded social and legal institution. Against this backdrop, many lawmak
ers and other analysts have expressed concerns that the creation of a "competing"
status for opposite sex couples would denigrate marriage. These concerns operate
first on a symbolic level, where the loss of exclusivity for marriage might send a
message about its diminished importance. Furthermore, on a practical level, the
question arises whether legal recognition of unmarried cohabitation would, in fact,
negatively influence private marriage decisions. Subsection C of Part II analyzes
these marriage-based policy concerns.
The fact that status recognition for opposite sex cohabitants would serve as an
alternative to marriage also makes the formulation of such a status problematic as a
practical matter. Specifically, formulating a new status would involve defining a
set of legal rights and obligations, between the partners and vis-a.-vis the govern
ment and third parties. Of course, marriage already exists as the "complete" adult
status, and the legal consequences associated with it are extensive. As described in
Part II Subsection D, the process of selecting among or reformulating the conse
quences of marriage, in order to define a comprehensive new status, would be a
formidable undertaking.
The question of legal recognition for cohabiting couples is often raised by one
or both partners in a particular doctrinal setting where family relationships matter.

15 See infra text accompanying notes 71-77 (discussing the constitutionality of criminal co
habitation laws).
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For example, in the case of Elden v. Sheldon, 16 a cohabitant sued for damages un
der California tort doctrines that allow recovery by a spouse whose partner has
been harmed by the negligent conduct of another person. Each legal context where
families are regulated, including the setting of ton law, is governed in part by pol
icy considerations unique to the particular subject matter. Thus, in the Elden case,
the California Supreme Court invoked the tort system policy requiring a reasonable
limitation on the number of persons to whom a negligent actor is potentially liable
in denying the cohabitant's claim for legal recognition. 17 In this manner, a policy
consideration based in the particular doctrinal field helped to shape the law govern
ing non-marital cohabitation in California. Subsection E of Part II explores the sig
nificance of this variable factor in evaluating the issue of status recognition for
unmarried cohabitants.
Another important consideration involves the uncertainty and unpredictability
about family status that would attend the legal recognition of nonformalized cohab
iting relationships. Unless a formal registration system is created, starns recognition
for nonmarital cohabitation would require case-by-case determinations to identify
those couples who qualify for recognition. The Subsection of Part II evaluating this
issue first discusses the general tension in the field of family law between clear
rules and discretion. Then, various proposals for extending legal recognition to
unmarried couples are assessed within this framework of analysis.
A final policy consideration shaping the law of unmarried cohabitation is re
spect for the autonomy of those couples who choose not to marry. The discussion
of this issue in Part IT first explores the meaning of privacy and autonomy in the
context of unmarried cohabitation. Ultimately, however, the decision to treat any
category of relationships as a legal family status involves a determination that the
goals of regulation outweigh the state's interest in fulfilling private wishes and in
tentions. Therefore, Subsection G of Part II also poses the question, whether the
goal of personal autonomy is a legitimate concern in analyzing the de facto family
relationships established between cohabitants.
The issue of recognition for unmarried cohabitation by opposite sex couples
as a legal family status is an important one. The publication of the Principles by
the American Law Institute in 2002 has reignited discussion about the appropriate
treatment of unmarried couples in the family law system. Furthermore, the current
debate in the United States about legal recognition for same sex partners has inevi
tably focused additional attention upon the general category of unmarried cohabi
tants. This Article identifies and analyzes the likely points of discussion in the un
folding debates about legal recognition and regulation for marriage-eligible cohabi
tants.

16 Elden

v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).

171d. at 586.
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CRIMINAL REGULATION OF UNMARRIED COHABITATION

When the Model Penal Code [MPC] was published in 1962,18 most states in
the United States criminalized nonmarital cohabitation. 19 The traditional social
norms, reflected in this type of criminal regulation, were in flux at that time. Fol
lowing substantial debate, the ALI decided not to include the offense of cohabita
tion in the MPC.20 Most, but not all, U.S. jurisdictions subsequently repealed their
unlawful cohabitation statutes. 21 Nevertheless, the traditional perception of unac
ceptability and immorality associated with the private decisions ofunmanied cou
ples to live together has continuing resonance in the present day regulation of un
married cohabitation.

A. The 2003 Debate in North Dakota
In April of 2003, the North Dakota Senate rejected a proposal to repeal the
state statute making unmarried cohabitation a criminal offense. 22 This was not the
first repeal effort in North Dakota. A similar proposal had been defeated twelve
years earlier (in 1991) in the State House by a vote of78 to 27. 23 The State House
reversed its position in 2003, approving the bill to repeal the unlawful cohabitation
law by a vote of 60 to 32. 24 The recent vote in the State Senate was much closer;
the repeal proposal was defeated there by a vote of 26 to 21. 25
The North Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute was first enacted during the
state's inaugural legislative session in 1890. 26 The current law provides that "[a]
person is guilty of a ... misdemeanor if he or she lives openly and notoriously with
a person of the opposite sex as a married couple without being married to the other
person.',27 The maximum penalty for persons convicted of unlawful cohabitation is
thirty days' imprisonment and a fine of $1000. 28
18 MODEL

PENAL CODE (1962).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 cm!. at 204-05 (Tentative Draft No.4 1955) (copy on file
with author) [hereinafter MPC TENTATIVE DRAFT].
20 See infra Part I, Subsection B (describing the debate surrounding the ALI's decision to ex
clude unlawful cohabitation from the MPC).
21 See infra note 68 (listing the handful of states that still have unlawful cohabitation statutes).
22 See H.B. 1175, 58th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2003), discussed in North Dakota Sen
ate Decides to Keep Cohabitation Illegal, STATE CAPITALS NEWSLETTERS. Family Relations, Alex
andria, VA, Apr. 7, 2003, at 9 [hereinafter Senate Decides]; Lawmakers Debate Repealing North
Dakota's Cohabitation Law, STATE CAPITALS NEWSLETTERS, Family Relations, Alexandria, VA,
Mar. 24, 2003, at 5-6 [hereinafter Lawmakers Debate].
23 Dale Wetzel, North Dakota: Lawmaker Wants to Repeal Cohabitation Law, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Jan. 14,2003, at C8, available at http://www.grandforks.com (last visited July 8,2004).
24 See Lawmakers Debate, supra note 22, at 6.
25 See Senate Decides, supra note 22, at 9.
26 North Dakota State Senate Keeps Cohabitation Law, Apr. 3, 2003, at
http://www.foxnews.com (copy of article on file with author and Journal ofLaw and Family Stud
ies) [hereinafter Senate Keeps Cohabitation Law].
27N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997).
28 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1997).
19 See
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Lawmakers on both sides of the debate to repeal the North Dakota statute
made familiar observations and arguments. Indeed, their discussion constitutes a
recent chapter in a long-running debate about the wisdom of regulating sexual ac
tivity between consenting adults. 29
Supporters of the recent repeal effort first pointed out that the North Dakota
unlawful cohabitation statute was rarely enforced, citing statements by state prose
cutors that they did not actively pursue cohabitation cases. 30 In fact, the last re
ported case involving a criminal prosecution for unlawful cohabitation in North
Dakota was decided by the state supreme court in 1938. 31 More recent cases in
North Dakota actually involved prosecutorial decisions notto pursue violators of
the unlawful cohabitation statute. In cases from 1999 and 2002, the state supreme
court rejected the efforts of private citizens to compel the state to prosecute their
unfaithful spouses for criminal cohabitation. 32 Generally speaking, the failure to
enforce existing criminal laws in this manner supports the case for their repeal,
based on the theory that such widespread nonenforcement leads to disrespect for
the legal system. 33 North Dakota legislators who sought to repeal the criminal co
habitation statute in 2003 relied in part on this rationale in their unsuccessful effort
to legalize unmarried cohabitation.
The supporters of decriminalization also emphasized the disrespect for indi
vidual privacy interests inherent in the North Dakota criminal cohabitation law,

29 See, e.g., infra Part I, Subsection B (discussing the debate that took place during the drafting
of the Model Penal Code of 1962); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 332-34; 341-47 (1993) (describing changes in sex crime regulations during the twentieth
century, which reflected the shifting weight assigned to conflicting viewpoints about the merits of
criminalizing sexual conduct); Craig A. Bowman & BlakeM. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union:
A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLL'M. L. REv. ! 164, 1183
n.92 (1992) (referencing the exchange between Professors Hart and Devlin regarding the legal en
forcement of morality).
30 See Senate Decides, supra note 22, at 10.
31 See State v. Hoffman, 282 N.W. 407 (N.D. 1938) (affirming the criminal conviction ofa
couple who lived together with their child).
32 See Wilson v. Koppy, 653 N.w.2d 68 (N.D. 2002); Olsen v. Koppy, 593 N.W.2d 762 (N.D.
1999).
33 For example. in assessing public perceptions about unenforced adultery laws, Professor
Mark Strasser made the following observation about public disrespect for the legal system:
[I]t is simply unclear what message unenforced laws communicate. Perhaps the message
is that society disapproves of adultery, although the failure to prosecute might also sug
gest that society believes adultery permissible or, at the very least, not particularly of
fensive. Further, yet another message might be communicated-by having laws remain
on the books even though those laws are rarely if ever enforced, society may communi
cate that it does not believe that its own laws must be taken seriously. Thus, by having
unenforced laws on the books, society may promote a lack of respect for those laws in
particular orfor law more generally.
Mark Strasser, Sex, Law and the Sacred Precincts ofthe Marital Bedroom: On State and Federal
Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 753. 781-82 (2000)
(citations omitted) (second emphasis added). See also infra text accompanying notes 51-55 (discuss
ing the impact of widespread nonenforcement of sex crime laws on the decision to exclude such
crimes from the Model Penal Code of 1962).
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and the inevitable intrusion into the private affairs of individual citizens required
for its enforcement. In the words of one sponsor of the repeal measure, "[g]iven the
complexity of the society we live in, and the diversity of it, in terms of morality
and law and what is and is not proper, r think we simply have to give people lati
tude.,,34 Other commentators pointed to specific examples of cohabitation which,
they believed, demonstrated the wisdom of repealing the criminal regulation. Thus,
one state representative asked whether "college students sharing apartments ...
and seniors sharing living arrangements in order to hang on to their maximum So
cial Security benefits ... are ... criminals.,,35 Another person spoke of her grand
mother, who lived with her male companion of twenty-three years and believed,
appropriately according to the granddaughter, that "what [she] was doing in the
privacy of [her] own home ... [was] none of your business.,,36
The North Dakota senators who voted down the repeal bill responded to both
the nonenforcement and privacy issues in predictable ways. First, according to the
opponents, the legislature can and should take a position on moral issues, such as
nonmarital cohabitation, even if the resulting legislation is not enforced. In the
words of one senator, "I think we need to set the standards for what we think is
right and wrong. Whether it's enforced or not is secondary:.37 In other words, this
lawmaker saw the penal law as serving an important function in setting out the
values and norms for behavior in the community. 38
Beyond the symbolic and normative functions of the law, opponents of repeal
also attempted to identify more tangible benefits associated with the North Dakota
unlawful cohabitation statute. Here, they took the position that the criminal pro
scription against cohabitation strengthened and stabilized families. To support this
position, the lawmakers cited statistics indicating higherrates of domestic violence
and instability in cohabiting families as compared to married families. 39 They did
not, however, attempt to demonstrate a causal connection between the decisions of
couples not to marry and the violence and instability in their families. Nor did they
attempt to demonstrate that the existence of a criminal law influenced marriage
decisions by couples in North Dakota. 4o

34

35

Wetzel, supra note 23, at 2 (quoting North Dakota Senator Linda Christenson).
Lawmakers Debate, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting North Dakota Representative Mary Ek

strom).
361d. (quoting North Dakota resident Carol Two Eagles). The concern about individual pri
vacy also has a constitutional dimension, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
37 Senate Decides, supra note 22, at 10 (quoting North Dakota Senator John Andrist).
3B See generally Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv.
515, 536-40 (2000) (discussing the symbolic and educational functions of criminal laws); Martha L.
Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behaviur: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981
WIS. L. REv. 275, 278-79 n.12 ("Once laws [such as statutes banning cohabitation] are established,
it is difficult [Q remove them: abolishing them assumes symbolic importance.").
39 See Lawmakers Debate. supra note 22, at 6.
40 The connection between unmarried cohabitation and socially undesirable behaviors contin
ues to be studied and discussed. See infra notes 191-93 (referring to numerous empirical studies
exploring the issue).
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Ironically, several of the votes that defeated the repeal legislation in the North
Dakota Senate in 2003 were apparently based on a misunderstanding about the
meaning of the statutory term "unlawful cohabitation.,,41 The confusion arose from
an ambiguous 1973 legislative amendment, which attempted to clarify the meaning
ofthe term "unlawful cohabitation" in the North Dakota statute. The 1973 amend
ment replaced the former statutory language, "cohabit[ing] as husband or wife,"
with the current language, "liv[ing] openly and notoriously with a person of the
opposite sex as a married couple. ,,42 In a subsequent (2001) housing discrimination
case, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected an argument that this amendment
was intended to restrict the scope of unlawful behavior to situations where an un
married couple misrepresented their status and held themselves out as spouses. In
its 2001 opinion, the high court reaffirmed that the North Dakota criminal statute
as amended "continue[d] to prohibit unlawful cohabitation.,,43 In spite of this clear
ruling by the North Dakota Supreme Court, the restricted definition of unlawful
cohabitation resurfaced during the legislative debates in 2003 about repealing the
criminal cohabitation statute. Following the defeat of the repeal bill, several sena
tors told interviewers that they had (mistakenly) believed that they were voting to
retain only an anti-fraud provision. 44 Given the closeness of the vote in the North
Dakota Senate (26 to 21), the legislative action defeating the reform proposal may
have been based on this misunderstanding about the scope of the criminal law.

B. The Model Penal Code of 1962
The recent debate in North Dakota illustrated a broader ideological conflict
about the merits of regulating sexual conduct between consenting adults within the
criminal law system. A classic example of the conflict unfolded when the Model
45
Penal Code of 1962 was promulgated by the American Law Institute as a model
criminal code. The MPC advisory committee initially included the crimes of open
and notorious fornication and illicit cohabitation in an early (1955) working draft
46
of the Code. 111icit cohabitation was defined as living together with a person of
the opposite sex other than a spouse in an open and notorious manner "under the
representation or appearance of being married.,,47 The limitation involving an "ap
pearance of being married" was a significant one, not contained in the majority of
See Senate Keeps Cohabitation Law, supra note 26.
See North Dakota Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551,559 (N.D. 2001) (de
scribing the 1973 amendment to the unlawful cohabitation statute).
43 Peterson, 625 N.W.2d at 560 (quoting the legislative history of the 1973 amendment).
44 See Jannel Cole, Votes Based on Wrong Reading, THE FORUM, Apr. 4,2003, at
http://www.in-forum.com (last visited July 8, 2004). Notably, a bill was introduced in the North
Dakota legislature in 2004, which is intended to restrict criminal conduct under the unlawful cohabi
tation statute to cases of cohabitation involving fraud. See North Dakota Lawmaker Proposes
Changes in Cohabitation Law, STATE CAPITALS NEWSLETTERS, Family Relations, Alexandria, VA,
Feb. 16.2004, at 9-10.
45 MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
46 See MPC TENTATNEDRAFT, supra note 19, § 207.1.
47Id.
41

42
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state unlawful cohabitation laws at that time. However, even this relatively nar
row cohabitation provision, along with the proposed fornication regulation, was
49
ultimately deleted by the ALI from the final version of the Code.
The commentary accompanying the 1955 draft of the MPC contains a sum
mary of the arguments supporting the advisory committee's decision to define
criminal cohabitation narrowly by including the "appearance of marriage" limita
tion. 50 Ultimately, the same arguments supported the decision by the ALI to com
pletely eliminate all regulation of unmarried cohabitation. Notably, the 1955 com
mentary contains many of the same arguments made by the proponents of the re
cent effort in North Dakota to repeal the state's criminal cohabitation statute.
First, the MPC advisory committee commented that the retention of widely
unenforced criminal laws, such as the existing sex crime regulations, diluted the
deterrent effect of other criminal laws.51 An additional concern raised about crimi
nallaws that were not fully enforced involved the possibility of discriminatory en
forcement. Here, the MPC commentary highlighted the selective enforcement of
sex crime regulations based on race. 52 The advisory committee's final concern re
lating to the nonenforcement of broad crimina! cohabitation and fornication laws
focused on their resulting use for purposes other than criminal regulation. 53 As ex
amples of this phenomenon, the MPC commentary cited and criticized the docu
mented use of criminal laws as leverage against cohabiting adulterous spouses in
divorce proceedings,54 and against unmarried cohabiting fathers in child support
proceedings. 55
Next, the advisory committee took the position that most of the sexual activity
historically regulated by broad criminal cohabitation and fornication statutes in
volved no victim and no harm beyond an affront to public morals. The committee
stated that this type of harm was not the proper concern of the criminal justice sys
tem, as follows: "We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to con
trol behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the
actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social int1u
ences.,,56

48 See id. A similar limitation appears in the North Dakota criminal cohabitation statute, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997) (applying to unmarried couples who live together "as a married
couple").
49 See MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
50 See MPC TENTATIVEDRAFf, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 204-16.
5J [d. at 206.
52 [d. at 205. More recently, the concern about discriminatory enforcement of unlawful cohabi
tation laws has been extended to the young and the poor, who are statistically more likely to be in
volved with law enforcement for other reasons. thereby opening the door to prosecution or the threat
of prosecution for unmarried cohabitation. See Fineman, supra note 38, at 306, 308.
53 The modern use of criminal cohabitation laws in this manner, as the basis for imposing other
criminal and civil sanctions on cohabiting individuals, is discussed at length infra Part I, Subsection

E.
54

See MPC TENTATIVE DRAFt, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 206.
at 207.

55 !d.
56 [d.
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The final argument against broad regulation under the Model Penal Code fo
cused on individual privacy rights. Here, the advisory committee emphasized the
importance of respecting different viewpoints among citizens about the morality of
various forms of sexual conduct, stating: "[I]n a heterogeneous community such as
ours, different individuals and groups have widely divergent views of the serious
ness of various moral derelictions.,,57 Of course, this same concern has come to
figure prominently in more recent debates about sex crime regulation, including
the 2003 legislative debate about the North Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute. 58
Having thus espoused a general position against legislating morality, the MPC
advisory committee attempted to justify its 1955 proposal to criminalize cohabita
tion, narrowly defined with the "appearance of marriage" limitation, on other
grounds. Here, the committee attempted to identify "secular aims,,59 uniquely asso
ciated with the regulation of cohabitation taking place "under the representation or
appearance of being married.,,60 The identified goals included promoting marriage
and decreasing the opportunities for violence, the birth of children outside of mar
riage, and disease. 61 Ultimately, the ALl membership voted down the advisory
committee's proposal, apparently failing to see the uniqueness ofthese concerns to
the "appearance of being married" context, or their association with the criminal
regulation of cohabitation in any form. 62 As in the recent North Dakota legislative
debate, the proponents of criminal regulation set forth secular or utilitarian goals,
but failed to establish that the criminal laws would further these purposes. 63
In the end, the MPC advisory committee reverted to a morality-based justifi
cation for including the narrowly-defined crime of cohabitation. Thus, their com
mentary stated that the behavior isolated for regulation, involving the appearance
of being married, "not only contravenes the morals of others, but openly and pro
vocatively flouts their standards ....,,64 The reference here to "provocatively
flout[ing]" the standards of others emphasized the open, public nature of the con

57 1d.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (describing the privacy arguments made by pro
ponents of the bill to repeal the North Dakota statute).
59MPC TENTATlVEDRAFr, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 207.
60 Id. § 207.1 at 86.
61 !d. § 207.1 cmt. at 207.
62 Professor Louis B. Schwartz, who served as co-reporter for the Model Penal Code, con
cluded that criminal regulation would not further the secular goals set forth by the advisory commit
tee, as follows:
The [MPC] Comments ... discuss various secular goals that might be served by penal
izing illicit sexual relations. such as promoting the stability of marriage, preventing ille
gitimacy and disease, or forestalling private violence against seducers. The judgment is
made that there is no reliable basis for believing that penal laws substantially contribute
to these goals.
Louis B. Schwartz. Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 674
(1963).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (discussing this aspect of the debate surrounding
the 2003 bill to repeal the North Dakota criminal cohabitation statute).
64MPC TENTATIVE DRAFf, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 207.
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65

duct included in the draft proposa1. Ultimately, the ALI found the proposed regu
lation of cohabitation, even with the limitation involving open and public conduct,
to be unacceptable, and excluded unmarried cohabitation from regulation under the
Model Penal Code of 1962.
C. Summary of Current Law

When the Model Penal Code was drafted, unlawful cohabitation statutes ap
peared in the criminal codes of most states, along with proscriptions against other
66
sex-based offenses such as adultery and fornication. The decision of the ALI to
exclude sex crimes from the final version of the MPC in 1962 became a major fac
tor influencing state lawmakers to repeal many of these state statutes in the decades
that followed. 67
Currently, only a handful of jurisdictions, including North Dakota, continue
the criminal ban on unmarried cohabitation. For example, the Michigan statute
entitled "Cohabitation by Unmarried Men and Women," which appears in a chap
ter of the state criminal code entitled "Indecency and Immorality," provides that
"[a]ny man or woman, not being married to each other, who lewdly and lascivi
ously associates and cohabits together, and any man or woman, married or unmar
ried, who is guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, is guilty of
a misdemeanor .... ,,68 The behavior of unmarried cohabitants involved in a sexual
relationship may violate additional criminal laws, such as the fornication statutes
which generally criminalize sexual conduct with a partner other than one's

65 This element of openness, and the distinction between private and public conduct, figures
prominently in many debates about the regulation of sexual conduct. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that "[t]he present case does not involve ... public conduct," in
announcing the unconstitutionality of a state criminal sodomy statute); Schwartz, supra note 62, at
674-76 (raising the question whether acts committed in private should be regulated, in the context of
various offenses including mistreatment of a corpse, cruel treatment of animals, flag burning, and
sexual offenses).
66 See MPC TENTATIVE DRAfT, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 204-05; CHARLES E. TORCIA, 2
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 210-15 (15th ed. 1994); RobertE. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity,
76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643, 647 -59 (2001) (describing in detail the laws regulating sexual conduct
as they existed in the 1950s).
67 See Fineman, supra note 38, at 276-77 ("Criminal statutes punishing cohabitation were re
pealed in many states after the appearance of the authoritative recommendations of the American
Law Institute in the Model Penal Code and an avalanche of commentary which criticized the use of
the criminal law to punish 'victimless crimes' or 'moral violations.'''). See generally FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, at 332-34,341-47 (describing historical trends in the regulation of sex crimes during
the twentieth century).
68 MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003). With the exception of the
North Dakota statute set out in the text above, see supra text accompanying note 27, the remaining
state statutes track the language of the Michigan provision, with minor variations. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 798.02 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-4 (Michie 2000).
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69

spouse. These regulations are more prevalent today than the unlawful cohabita
tion laws, and are also widely unenforced. 70
The remaining state laws that criminalize unmarried cohabitation are most
likely unconstitutional, under the privacy doctrine established by the United States
Supreme Court. Generally speaking, the Court has recognized a zone of individual
privacy relating to sexuality and procreation that must be respected by the govern
ment. 71 Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have ruled on the validity
of state cohabitation statutes under the privacy doctrine. 72 However, the rulings in
related cases involving the state regulation of private sexual activity, especially the
2003 decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,73 could be easily ex
tended to the criminal regulation of cohabitation.
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of a Texas
statute criminalizing sexual activity between same sex partners. In doing so, the
Court stated that the State's morality-based justifications for the criminal sodomy
law could not withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Furthermore,
the State was unable to establish a non-morality-based rationale weighty enough to
justify the governmental intrusion on personal privacy contemplated by the Texas
statute.
In the face of a similar constitutional challenge to one of the remaining crimi
nal cohabitation statutes, the state would have to establish a non-morality-based
goal that is furthered by the ban on unmarried cohabitation. The primary state in
terest operating in the nonmarital cohabitation context, and absent from the subject
of regulation under the same sex sodomy law in Lawrence, is the state's interest in
promoting the institution of marriage. 75 Historically and today, the state's interest
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 664 (7th ed. 1999) (defining fornication).
See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE To AMERICA'S SEX LAWS
98-102 (1996).
71 See 3 RONALDD. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.30
(3d ed. 2000).
72 In Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986), the federal court was asked to rule on the
precise issue posed in the text: whether a state criminal cohabitation statute violated the federal con
stitutional guarantee of privacy. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case without
reaching the merits "for want of a justiciable case or controversy." [d. at 1204.
73 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
74 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186 (1986), where
an earlier constitutional challenge to a state criminal sodomy statute had failed, stating:
[T]he court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to conderrm homosexual conduct as immoral. The conderrmation has
been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and re
spect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns ....
These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the
whole society through operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833,850 (1992».
75 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court ruled that "respect for the traditional family" was not a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the encroachment on individual privacy authorized by the
69
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in the institution of marriage has provided the rationale for numerous state regula
tions, including those limiting the legal rights of cohabiting couples, and has gen
erally received deference in the couns?6 The difficult part of the state's argument
in this hypothetical analysis would involve the need to establish a connection be
tween the criminal cohabitation law and the state's goals regarding the institution
of marriage. If the state failed to demonstrate that the criminal regulation furthers
the state's marriage-related goals, which seems likely, the unlawful cohabitation
77
statute would fail to survive constitutional scrutiny under the privacy doctrine.
Aside from its constitutional significance, the Lawrence case may also have
an impact on political decisions about the designation of unmarried cohabitation as
a crime. Perhaps the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence will influence the votes
of state lawmakers when proposals to repeal sex crime statutes, like the recent ini
tiative in North Dakota, arise in the future. On the one hand, lawmakers may be
positively influenced by the Court's broad statements regarding the importance of
individual privacy rights in our increasingly diverse society, and vote to remove
state restrictions on individual autonomy. On the other hand, the Lawrence case
could generate a political backlash, whereby lawmakers feel pressure from conser
vative groups to pursue a legislative agenda that will serve as a counterweight to
the perceived activism of the Court in this field. 78

D. Are the Criminal Cohabitation Laws Enforced?
In declaring the unconstitutionality of the Texas statute in Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court referred to the Widespread nonenforcement of state criminal
sodomy laws. 79 And, as described above, the issue of nonenforcement figured
prominently in the mid-twentieth century debate about excluding the crimes offor
nication and cohabitation from the Model Penal Code,80 and in the recent debate
81
about retaining the North Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute. As illustrated
there, the opponents of so-called morals regulations maintain that the absence of

Texas sodomy law. See id at 571-72. The state did not assert, and the Court did not rule upon, a
marriage-specific rationale for the regulation.
76 See infra Part n, Subsection C (discussing impact of the state interest in marriage on the
formulation of laws regulating unmarried cohabitants).
77 The work of scholars who explored the boundaries ofthefederal constitutional privacy doc
trine in the pre-Lawrence era is helpful in pursuing the inquiry into the constitutionality of cohabita
tion statutes. See, e.g.. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, § 18.30, at 648-53; Strasser, supra
note 33, at 769-88 (discussing heightened constitutional protection under the privacy doctrine for
conduct that occurs within marriage).
78 See Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,2003, at 48 (dis
cussing the possible impact of Lawrence on the development of laws regarding same sex marriage).
79 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 ('The history of nonenforcement [of criminal sodomy laws]
suggests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual con
ducL") (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (Powell. J., concurring)).
gO See supra text accompanying notes 51-55 (discussing the significance of widespread nonen
forcement in the decision to exclude sex crimes from the Model Penal Code of 1962).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (describing North Dakota legislative debate).
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direct criminal enforcement renders such laws obsolete, while proponents disagree
with this conclusion.
Rarely has the common assumption about nonenforcement of the criminal co
habitation statutes been questioned or empirically tested. A major exception is the
1981 report by Professor Martha L. Fineman about a study of enforcement prac
82
tices in the state of Wisconsin. The study covered a five-year period during the
late 1970s, and was based on information provided by sixty of the seventy-one
county prosecutors in the state.
According to Fineman, "[t]he most surprising information received ... was
that more than ninety prosecutions, spread over a dozen counties in Wisconsin, had
occurred within the five-year period .... ,,83 On the other hand, no prosecutions for
cohabitation had been initiated in the large majority (forty-eight) of the reporting
84
counties. Furthermore, even in the prosecuting counties, no independent investi
gations of criminal cohabitation had been initiated by the state. Rather, prosecu
tions typically occurred following the complaint of a third party, such as the wel
fare department or the cohabitant's landlord, neighbor, or former spouse, or when
law enforcement officers discovered the cohabiting relationship while investigating
another crime. 85 As to cases referred to prosecutors in these various ways, the dis
trict attorneys in just two counties pursued "a policy of prosecuting all cohabitation
cases referred to them if there was sufficient evidence.,,86
Fineman analyzed the reported criminal cohabitation cases in Wisconsin, and
concluded that the large majority of prosecutions were undertaken "only in ex
traordinary situations. For example, prosecutions under the cohabitation statute
might be initiated when other statutory provisions had proven inadequate to deal
with [another legal] problem,,,81 most often in families receiving public assistance.
Thus, the district attorney might initiate a prosecution for cohabitation against the
recipient of public assistance who lied about household composition or income, or
against the cohabiting unmarried father who failed to provide support for his de
pendent child. 88 In another category of cases, the district attorneys used cohabita
tion prosecutions as a method of intervening in violent farnilies. 89 Finally, prosecu
tors reported using the mere threat of a criminal prosecution as leverage to force a
violent cohabitor to leave the home, or to coerce an unmarried cohabiting father to
pay child support. 90
Based on this data, Fineman concluded that the common wisdom about
nonenforcement was inaccurate. In her words, "[t]he simplistic notion, held by
82 See Fineman, supra note 38. The Wisconsin criminal cohabitation statute, which provided
the basis for the study reponed by Fineman, has since been repealed.
83 [d. at 287.
84 [d. at 288.
85 [d. at 288-93.
36 [d. at 289.

87 [d.

89

[d. at 290-91.
[d. at 291.

90

Id. at 297 & nn.89-90.
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many, that the cohabitation statute is not used by prosecutors can no longer be
maintained.,,91 On the other hand, Fineman demonstrated that almost all prosecu
tions under the Wisconsin statute were designed to accomplish goals other than the
immediate purposes of the criminal cohabitation law itself. 92

E. Civil Sanctions Associated With Criminal Cohabitation
The Fineman report regarding enforcement of the Wisconsin criminal cohabi
tation statute described the prosecution of criminal cohabitation cases to achieve
secondary state purposes, such as coercing a violent cohabitant to leave the horne.
The criminal cohabitation statutes are also used by state actors as the basis for im
posing certain noncriminal sanctions upon unmarried cohabitants. As described in
this Subsection, this type of secondary enforcement occurs in a wide range oflegal
settings where individuals are regulated by the state. 93 The legal sanctions imposed
on unmarried cohabitants include the denial of employment opportunities and pro
94
fessionallicenses, loss of child custody, and loss offederal income tax benefits.
For example, the American Association for Single People [AASP] website re
cently reported on the case of Darlene Kay Davis, who was denied the renewal of
her daycare license by the State of Virginia Licensing Department in June of
95
2001. Virginia is one of the handful of states that have not repealed their criminal
91Id. at 288.
the commentary accompanying the 1955 Tentative Draft of the Model Penal Code
criticized the type of enforcement of sex crime laws observed by Fineman, stating that such instru
mental uses of otherwise unenforced criminal laws did not justify their continued existence. See
MPC TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 19, § 207.1 cmt. at 206 (noting with disapproval that a criminal
complaint might be filed against an adulterous, cohabiting spouse for the purpose of securing a fa
vorable divorce settlement for the other spouse).
93 Professor Robert E. Rodes provided a historical perspective on the use of criminal laws in
this manner as the basis for imposing civil sanctions by summarizing the extensive regulation of
sexual conduct in the 19505. See Rodes, supra note 66. Rodes identified a number of situations
where official determinations about individual "good moral character" could be influenced by a
person's sexual behavior. For example, "public employees, especially teachers, could be fired" for
violating criminal laws regulating sexual conduct, including unlawful cohabitation statutes. Id. at
652-53. Rodes also catalogued cases involving determinations about fitness for U.S. citizenship, and
the loss of professional licenses by doctors and lawyers whose sexual conduct was determined to
exhibit poor moral character. Id.
94 For a comprehensive exploration of such secondary enforcement of criminal laws whose di
rect enforcement has been abandoned by state pro:secutors, see Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws:
The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation. 16 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 169 (1997). Greene noted that "the unique combination of social impulses necessary to
retain but not to enforce a statute," and, hence, the problem of secondary enforcement, "arises al
most exclusively within the sphere of morality laws." Id. at 173. Critical of the phenomenon of sec
ondary enforcement in this context, Greene proposed a theory of "conditional desuetude," whereby
the courts would disallow the secondary enforcement of criminal laws following a significant period
of nonenforcement by criminal prosecutors. See Ed. at 186-93.
95 See Virginia Threatens to Deny AASP Member a License for Day Care Center Because of
Her Unmarried Living Arrangement, at
http://www.unmarriedamerica.orglVirginia-DavisDayCare.htm (June 25, 2001). TIle facts about the
92 Notably,
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cohabitation statutes. 96 According to the AASP report, Ms. Davis had maintained a
daycare service in her home for thirty years, and had lived there with her male
companion for seventeen years, prior to the denial of her renewal application. The
couple had not married, although they were eligible to do so, because Ms. Davis
would thereby lose the health insurance coverage she received as the surviving
spouse of her deceased husband. On prior license applications, Ms. Davis had
listed her partner as a "boarder" in her home; in 2001, she listed him as a "com
panion." This change apparently alerted the state to the nature of Ms. Davis's rela
tionship with her partner, and led to the denial of her renewal application. After the
AASP and the American Civil Liberties Union became involved in the case, the
State of Virginia Licensing Department reversed its earlier decision and, with no
97
explanation, renewed Ms. Davis's daycare license.
As in the Virginia daycare case, the imposition of noncriminal sanctions on
unmarried cohabitants frequently occurs in situations involving children. Another
recent case, reported in the Los Angeles Times, involved the loss of a job opportu
nity by an unmarried cohabitant who applied for the position of juvenile probation
officer in Phoenix. 9R According to the news report, the six-page job application
form included the question, "[a]re you living in open and notorious cohabita
tion ?,,99 The application form also stated that such cohabitation was a crime in Ari
zona, and would disqualify an applicant for the position of juvenile probation offi
cer. IOO The Arizona job applicant, Debbie Deem, had lived with her male partner
for eight years. Rather than confront the state's disapproval of her relationship, Ms.
Deem decided to move to California. lol As in the Virginia daycare case, the con
text in which the state's concern about the impact of a person's unmarried cohabi
tation on fitness for a particular occupation here involved work with children.
The most notorious example of secondary enforcement of the criminal cohabi
tation laws, centered around the state's interest in children, occurred in the case of
Jarrett v. Jarrett,102 which was decided by the illinois Supreme Court in 1979.
There, the divorced mother of three girls lost custody of them, based on her deci
sion to cohabit with a new partner. Although eligible to marry, the couple had a
significant financial incentive for not doing so. Namely, Ms. Jarrett was required
by her divorce decree to sell the family home in the event of her remarriage. 103 In
Darlene Kay Davis case recited in the text were reported here.
96 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie 1996).
97 See www.unmarriedarnerica.orgJIetters-received/ASAP_membecthanks_exdirThomasCole
man-Aprilll, 2002.html.
98 See Robin Fields, 7 States Still Classify Cohabitation as Illegal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001,
at A13.
99Id.
100

The Arizona statute, entitled "[0 ]pen and notorious cohabitation or adultery," ARIZ. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 13-1409 (2001), was subsequently repealed, along with the state's criminal sodomy

statute, amid a great deal of controversy. See Beth De Falco, Hull Signs Repeal of Sex Laws,
ARIZONA REpUBUC. May 9,2001, available at http://www.gaylawnet.com(last visited July 8, 2004).
101 All of the facts recited in the text were reported in Fields, supra note 98.
102 Jarrett v. Jarrett. 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979).
103 [d. at 422.
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Jarrett, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the mother's living arrangement was
harmful to the children who shared her home and, essentially, rendered her unsuit
able to parent them. On this basis, the high court affirmed the trial coun's decision
to transfer custody of the girls to their father. 104
At the time of the Jarrett case, the relevant criminal statute in Illinois pro
vided that "[a]ny person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another not
his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open and notorious." 105 The Illi
nois Supreme Court relied upon this statute in reaching its conclusion about the
impact of the mother's open cohabitation on her fitness as a parent, as follows:
The fornication statute ... evidence(s) the relevant moral standards
of this State, as declared by our legislature.... It is, in our judg
ment, clear that [the mother's] conduct offends prevailing public
policy....
. . . [The mother's] disregard for existing standards of conduct
instructs her children, by example .... That factor, of course, sup
ports the trial court's conclusion that their daily presence in that en
vironment was injurious to the moral well-being and development of
the children. 106
Two developments in illinois law since 1979 have weakened the rule an
nounced by the state high court in Jarrett v. Jarrett. Most significantly, the illinois
Supreme Court revisited the issue of the Jarrett case three years later, and reformu
lated the rule it had announced there. In In re Thompson ,107 the divorce court
awarded the custody of a four-year-old boy to his father, who had engaged in an
extra-marital relationship during the parents' marital separation. In affirming this
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the mother's claim that the rule ofthe
Jarrett case required a different result. The mother in Thompson argued that
Jarrett had established the firm rule that a cohabiting parent is per se an unsuitable
custodian. According to the Thompson court, however, Jarrett had simply reaf
firmed the principle that "all of the circumstances must be considered that affect
the best interests of the child,,108 in post-divorce custody cases. 109 The lower courts
See id. at 426.
Id. at 424 (quoting § 11-8 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, which has since been
amended as described infra text accompanying notes 111-12).
106 Id. at 424. See also Sugar Shack: The Virginia Legislature Should Not Repeal the Law
Against Cohabitation, THE FREE LANCE-STAR, Aug. I. 2003, available at
http://www.freelance-star.com!news!fls/2003/082003/080120031l 055830 (last accessed Nov. 15,
2004) (arguing that Virginia's unlawful cohabitation statute, although not regularly enforced
thrcugh criminal prosecution, is properly used by judges in custody cases as the basis for requiring
parents to tenninate cohabiting relationships as a condition of custody).
107 In re Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1983).
108 Id. at 93.
109 Notably, the concurring judge in Thompson disagreed with this construction of Jarrett,
stating: "I do not concur in the statement 'The Jarrett case does not establish aconclusive presump
tion that, because a custodial parent cohabits with a member of the opposite sex, the child is
104
105
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in Illinois have subsequently followed the rule of the Thompson case, and have
considered the parents' respective living arrangements as one of many relevant
factors in custody disputes between divorcing parents. 110
The second development in Illinois law since 1979, which arguably diluted
the significance of parental cohabitation in custody cases, was the amendment of
the fornication statute by the state legislature. III In redefining the conduct that con
stitutes the crime of fornication, the legislature deleted the express statutory refer
ence to cohabitation. As amended, the current statute provides: "Any person who
has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the be
havior is open and notorious.,,112 Although a cohabiting custodial parent would
continue to be in violation of the amended statute, the particular harm identified by
the Jarrett court-the residence of children in the same home as their parent and
an unmarried cohabitant-is no longer the subject of express regulation in the llli
nois penal code.
Of course, neither this statutory modification nor the lllinois Supreme Court's
opinion in Thompson guarantees that cohabiting parents in illinois will no longer
be viewed harshly by judges in custody disputes. Trial judges in Illinois have wide
discretion under the best interests of the child standard in deciding the relative
weight of each relevant factor in individual custody cases. l13 Thus, a determination
may still be made that a parent's decision to cohabit has significant, negative rami
fications for the child's wellbeing in a particular case, and thus provides a basis for
awarding custody to the other parent.
Not surprisingly, the relevance of parental cohabitation in child custody cases
has been addressed in many jurisdictions besides Illinois. Nationwide, there is no
consensus on this important issue, 114 which affects the rights of many parents and
children in the custody courtroom and at the bargaining table when parents negoti
ate custody agreements. Even in states where the fornication and cohabitation stat
utes have been removed from the criminal code, parental living arrangements may
continue to play an important role in custody cases. 115

harmed.''' [d. at 93-94 (Moran, J., specially concurring) (quoting the majority opinion in Thomp
son).
110 See, e.g., In re Marriage ofR.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ("[T]o the ex
tent that Jarrett held that open and notorious cohabitation necessarily reqUires a change in custody,
that holding was effectively reversed by the Thompson court. Further, Thompson makes it clear that
Illinois couns cannot presume that a custodial parent's cohabitation is harmful to a child.").
111 See Jan Skelton, Hewitt to Ayala: A Wrong Turn for Cohabitants' Rights, 82lLL. B. 1. 364,
366 (1994) (describing the action of the Illinois legislature deleting the statutory reference to co
habitation, effective Jan. 1, 1990).
112 72 0 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/l1-8(a) (2002).
113 See Thompson, 449 N.E.2d at 93.
114 See 2 SANDRA MORGAN LITTLE, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE §
10.12[2] (2003); Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations With Third PersonAs Justifying
Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 §§ 14-17 (1980 & Supp. 2004) (collecting
cases involving post-divorce heterosexual cohabitation).
115 For example. a bill was recently introduced in the Iowa legislature that would modify the
state custody law in a manner burdensome to custodial parents living with unmarried partners, by
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For example, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas recently expressed its opinion
about the negative impact of a divorced parent's unmarried cohabitation upon child
custody claims. In Word v. Remick,116 the appellate court affirmed a tda! court de
cision to transfer the post-divorce custody of two small children to their father,
based on several factors including the mother's decision to live with her partner. In
its opinion, the appellate court made the following general statement about the
relevance of a custodial parent's unmarried cohabitation:
In any event, extramarital cohabitation in the presence of the chil
dren has never been condoned in Arkansas, is contrary to the public
policy of promoting a stable environment for children, and may of
itself constitute a material change of circumstances warranting a
change of custody. It goes without saying that this is a significant
factor in determining where the best interests of the children require
them to be placed. 1l7
Beyond the regulation of cohabiting adults in spheres of activity where they
interact with children, such as employment and parenthood, the state may penalize
unmarried cohabitants in other contexts as well, based on the criminality or per
ceived immorality of their conduct. For example, under the federal income tax
code, the cohabiting taxpayer is denied an otherwise available dependency exemp
tion for his or her cohabiting partner, if they happen to reside in a state that crimi
nalizes their relationship. Section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code [IRC] 118 cre
ates a dependency exemption for any household member who receives financial
support from the taxpayer. However, this deduction from taxable income is not
available "if ... the relationship between such individual and the taxpayer is in
violation oflocallaw.,,119 Congress added this limitation to the dependencyexemp
permitting the other parent to more easily reopen the existing custody order. See H.F. 330, 80th Gen.
Assemb., Human Res. Comm. (Iowa 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/GA/80GAlLegislation/-HF/00300/HF00330/Current.htrnl (last visited
March 22, 2005). Notably, the stated rationale for the proposed legislation involves aconcem about
the possibility of child abuse by the cohabitants of custodial parents, and not the reservation about
parental fitness discussed in the text. See Live-In Companion Could Threaten Child Custody (Feb.
26,2003), available at http://www.theiowa-channel.com/politics/2004965/detail.html (last visited
Nov. 20,2004). The Iowa House Human Resources Committee approved the bill in 2003. See id.
The bill is scheduled for consideration when the Iowa legislature reconvenes in January 2005. See
http://www.legis.state.ia.us.
116 Word v. Remick, 58 S.w,3d 422 (Ark. Ct. App, 2001).
1[7 Id. at 427 (citation omitted).
118 26 U.S.C.A. § 152 (2002).
[19 26 U.S.C.A. § 152(b)(5), discussed in William V. Vetter, l,R,C. § 152(b)(5) and Victorian
Morality in Contemporary Life, 13 Y ALEL. &POL'yREv. 115 (1995). The amountdeductiblefrom
taxable income for each ofthe taxpayer's dependents, which varies from year to year, was $3110 in
2004. See 2004 RIA FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK § 3114 (2004),
Additional dependency exemptions are available for persons who are financially dependent
upon and closely related to (but not necessarily residing with) the taxpayer. The cohabiting relation
ship is not included in the list of qualifying relationships for this purpose. See 26 U.S.c.A. § 152
(a)(I)-(9) (2002) (listing qualifying relationships).
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tion provision of section 152 in 1958, and the legislative history reveals that Con
120
gress had unmarried cohabitants in mind at that time.
Notably, the Internal Revenue Service had imposed the same limitation as an
administrative matter, even before Congress addressed the issue. The Tax Court
upheld this administrative construction of the dependency exemption provision in
the case of Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 121 which was decided shortly before Con
gress amended § 152 in 1958. In Turnipseed, the Tax Court ruled that an Alabama
taxpayer was not entitled to a dependency exemption for his unmarried cohabitant,
stating:
In our opinion Congress never intended [IRC § 152] to be construed
so literally as to permit a dependency exemption for an individual
whom the taxpayer is maintaining in an illicit relationship in con
scious violation of the criminal law of the jurisdiction of his abode..

. . . [T]o so construe the statute would in effect ascribe to the
Congress an intent to countenance, if not to aid and encourage, a
condition not only universally regarded as against good public mor
als, but also constituting a continuing, willful, open, and deliberate
violation ofthe [criminal statute in Alabama]. This we are unable to
do. l22
One year later, Congress affirmed the Tax Court's observation in Turnipseed about
the intent of the legislative body by enacting the amendment to IRC § 152 quoted
above.
In the modern context, where most states have repealed their criminal cohabi
tation statutes, the taxpayer who resides with a dependent cohabiting partner in a
nonrepealing state must endure an extra tax burden. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals approved this unequal treatment of federal taxpayers in the 1979 case of
Ensminger v. Commissioner. 123 There, the court acknowledged that taxpayer
Ensminger, who was denied the dependency exemption for his cohabiting partner
because cohabitation was a crime in his home state of North Carolina, would have
been entitled to the exemption if he Ii ved in another state. The court justified this
result, as follows:
This [reference to state law in IRC § 1521 produces some inequality
in taxation, but it illustrates the deference Congress has demon
strated for state laws in this area and its attempts to insure that, in
the application of federal tax laws, taxpayers will be treated in their

120 See S. REp. No. 85-1983, at 123-24 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.e.A.N 4791,4804,
discussed in Ensminger v. Carom'r, 610 F.2d 189,191 (4th Cir. 1979).
121 Turnipseed v. Camm'r, 27 T.e. 758 (1957).
122 ld. at 760-61.
123 Ensminger v. Carom'r, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979).
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intimate and personal relationships as the state in which they reside
treats them. 124

As described in the Turnipseed and Ensminger opinions, the denial of federal
tax benefits to unmarried cohabitants has been premised on the illegality and per
ceived immorality of the taxpayer's relationship, as defined in the state criminal
codes. The doctrine of federal constitutional privacy, recently applied by the
United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,125 raises a question about the
constitutionality of this form of secondary enforcement of state criminal cohabita
tion statutes. The same constitutional question also arises in the other legal settings
discussed in this Subsection, involving the denial of a daycare license, 126 disquali
fication for the position ofjuvenile probation officer, 127 and the loss of child cus
tody.128
As discussed above in Subsection C, the constitutional privacy doctrine im
poses significant limits on the state's authority to regulate private, intimate con
duct. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court ruled that morality-based justifications were
insufficient to validate the criminal regulation of private conduct under the crimi
nal sodomy statute in Texas. 129 Arguably, the various civil law sanctions imposed
upon unmarried cohabitants, based on the violation of criminal cohabitation laws,
are also subject to review within this constitutional frame of reference. In the fu
ture, the states may be required to establish a non-morality-based justification for
the negative treatment of unmarried cohabitation in each of the contexts discussed
in this Subsection, in order to survive constitutional review by the courts. 130
Not just at the level of constitutional review, but also at the level of state pol
icy analysis, the meaningful assessment of unmarried cohabitation in the law in

124Id. at 191. See generally Vetter, supra note 119, at 129-30 (proposing modification of §
l52(b)(5) whereby denial of a cohabitant's dependency exemption would occur only if the relevant
criminal cohabitation law was generally enforced within the state's criminal justice system).
There are other instances where federal law consequences tum on the state regulation of per
sonal relationships, and the relevant state laws are not uniform. For example, many federal laws,
including the income tax, Social Security, and immigration laws, award benefits to married persons.
While some states recognize nonformalized, common law marriages, others do not. See infra text
accompanying notes 250-58 (discussing common law marriage doctrine). As a result of the federal
deference to state domestic relations law, the informally married couple mayor may not receive
federal benefits, depending upon which state's marriage law governs their family status.
125 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 102-17.
129 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78, discussed supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
130Non-morality-based justifications are easily asserted in these contexts. However, testing the
extent to which they are furthered by discrimination against unmarried cohabitants is a more diffi
cult matter. For.example, in the custody context, the state may assert that the wellbeing of children is
an important state interest, and that a custodial parent's decision to cohabit negatively affects child
well-being because it creates an unstable or confusing home environment. Here, the difficult part of
the state's case will be proving the asserted negative connection between unmarried cohabitation
and child wellbeing.
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volves many considerations that transcend moral condemnation. Part II of this Ar
ticle explores the legal treatment of unmarried, opposite sex cohabitation as a fam
ily status. Although notions of right and wrong continue to appear in many discus
sions of this topic, additional policy considerations are shaping the development of
the law in this field.

II.

STATUS REGULATION OF UNMARRIED COHABITATION

A. Summary of Current Law
Many unmarried couples in the United States today never experience the legal
effects of the criminal cohabitation statutes described above, in the form of either
direct criminal enforcement or the imposition of civil sanctions such as job dis
crimination in the public sector. However, unmarried couples experience another
form of disapproval by the legal system on a daily basis. Namely, the relationship
of unmarried cohabitants is not, as a general rule, recognized as a legally signifi
cant family status. As a result, no benefits or obligations, either between the part
ners or vis-a.-vis third parties and the government, attach to the relationship. For
some cohabitants, this is a desired and welcome legal result. 131 For many others,
however, nonrecognition results in distinct hardships. 132
The term "legal status" is used in various fields of law to refer to a relation
ship between persons which, by virtue of its existence, entails legal conse
quences. 133 Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "status" to mean "[a] legal per
sonal relationship or condition, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the
mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned.,,134
The family relationships of wife and husband and parent and child are the quintes

131

See infra Part II, Subsection G (discussing privacy and autonomy of unmarried cohabi

tants).
132 See infra Part II, Subsection B (discussing concerns about fairness and the need to protect
dependent family members).
133 See Dikeman v. Carla Properties, Ltd., 871 P.2d474, 479-80 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (referring
to "the responsibilities that attend that status or relationship [oflandlord-tenant], such as maintain
ing the common areas of the apartment complex in a safe condition") (emphasis added); Bass v.
Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (describing requirements for creating "partnership status" to
support claim of surviving partner to one-half of partnership assets); JOHN DEWrrr GREGORY ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 2.02, at 28 (2d ed. 2001) ("[Municipal domestic partnership] ordi
nances extend various municipal benefits to an individual's spousal equivalent ... as an effective
means for conferring certain legally recognized status benefits on unmarried heterosexual and ho
mosexual domestic partners.") (emphasis in original); Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of
Non-Marital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1265, 1272 (2001) ("In marriage, rights and benefits accrue to the parties during their
relationship by virtue of their marital status.").
134 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (3d ed. 1969). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 69, at 1419 (defining "status" to mean H[a] person's legal condition insofar as it is im
posed by the law without the person's consent, as opposed to a condition that the person has ac
quired by agreement").
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sential examples of status relationship, so defined, in the 1aw. 135 Numerous legal
rules, which together define these family status relationships, create distinct protec
tions, entitlements and responsibilities for spouses, parents and children, in fields
as diverse as child custody, support, property, inheritance, taxation, social benefit
programs, tort law, and criminal law. 136
By way of contrast, the relationships established between cohabiting, opposite
sex couples are not regarded as family status relationships for most legal purposes.
On the contrary, historically, the cohabiting relationship was treated as a "negative
status" in the law. 137 That is, unmarried cohabitants experienced significant legal
burdens by virtue of their relationship alone. The best illustration of this premise is
the traditional criminalization of the conduct of cohabitants, discussed earlier in
this Article. 138 The legal system has, for the most part, moved beyond this form of
negative treatment in the criminal law context, as evidenced by the repeal of
unlawful cohabitation statutes in most states. 139
Another example of the shift away from negative status treatment for unmar
ried cohabitants involves their economic claims inter se at the time of relationship
dissolution. Prior to the seminal decision of the California Supreme Court in 1976
in Marvin v. Marvin, J40 many states refused to recognize any legal claims between
unmarried cohabitants, including requests for the judicial enforcement of their pri
vate contracts regarding economic issues. 141 This negative status approach, which
denied basic contract rights to unmarried cohabitants, was based on a view that
their relationship, and therefore the contract between them, was immoral and ille
142
gal. The Marvin opinion established contract enforcement as an available rem
edy for California cohabitants. In the decades since the Marvin case was decided,
the courts and legislatures in almost all states have adopted some version of this
contract doctrine. 143 The development of contract remedies for cohabitants in this
135 See Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1365, 1377 (2001) ("[t]he terms husband, wife, parent, and child are status labels conferred by
the law, with legal.consequence").
136 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,955-57 (Mass. 2003) (catalogu
ing the numerous legal consequences of the marriage status); David L. Chambers, What If? The
Legal Consequences ofMarriage and the Legal Needs ofLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 447 (1996) (same).
137 See Reppy, supra note 4, at 1678-85 (describing the "negative status" of cohabiting cou
ples, with emphasis on the traditional refusal ofjudges to enforce contracts between the parties re
garding economic matters).
138 See supra Part 1.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (describing the repeal of criminal cohabitation
statutes in all but a few states).
140 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
14\ See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133, § 2.02, at 23 ("Traditionally, the law viewed unmar
ried cohabitation relationships with disfavor .... Couples engaged in such relationships could not
look to the courts to define their legal rights and obligations, nor to resolve their disputes in the
event their relationship failed.").
142 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 112 (discussing pre-Marvin California case law); GREGORYET AL.,
supra note 133, § 2.02, at 23.
Id3 See 6 FAM. L. & PRACTICE §§ 65.04-.05 (Arnold H. Ruskin ed.. 2002) (surrunarizing the
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manner did not, at least in theory, create a special legal status for cohabitants, but
rather removed a relationship-based impediment to their contractual freedom. 144
Currently, only a few states have doctrines in place that go beyond contract
enforcement by establishing status-based property rights for unmarried cohabitants
at the time of relationship dissolution. 145 Recently, the American Law Institute de
voted Chapter 6 of the Principles ofthe Law of Family Dissolution to this impor
tant matter. /46 Contrary to the current law in most states, the Principles proposed
that eligible unmarried couples should have the same economic rights as spouses at
the time of relationship dissolution: the equitable distribution of property and debts
acquired during the relationship, and the compensatory payments that replace ali
147
mony and spousal maintenance under the ALI proposal. In this manner, the
Principles would establish unmarried cohabitation as an important family status in
the law. 148 To date, no state legislature has enacted this proposed reform of state
family law.

range of state law approaches to resolving economic claims between former cohabitants under con
tract-based doctrines); David Westfall, Forcing Incidents ofMarriage on Unmarried Cohabitants:
The American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1467,
1474-76 (2001) (same); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United
States, 26 LAW &POL'y 119, 125 (2004)(notingthatthree states-illinois, Georgia and Louisiana
maintain the traditional view that contracts between unmarried cohabitants are unenforceable).
The Marvin opinion and the developing law in some other jurisdictions also extended other
established doctrines and remedies to unmarried cohabitors at the time ofdissolution, such as result
ing trust, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable lien and implied partnership. See Marvin,
557 P.2d at 122-23; Bowman & Cornish, supra note 29, at 1173-74 (defining each of these doc
trines and providing illustrations of their application in cohabitation cases).
144 The accuracy of the statement in the text is tested in jurisdictions where the courts apply an
expansive doctrine of implied contract to determine whether enforceable promises exist at the time
of relationship dissolution. Here, basing economic claims on patterns of loving behavior in family
relationships may look more like status recognition than contract enforcement. See PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.03 cmt. b, at 918 ("Some courts reach much
further than others [in applying implied contract doctrines]. In doing so, they appear to vindicate an
equitable rather than a contractual principle."); Blumberg, supra note 133, at 1294 ("[c]ourts that
have been willing to infer an agreement from the parties' domestic behavior straddle the boundary
between contract and status.").
145 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILYDISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.03 cmt. b, at 933-94
(referring to case law in the state of Washington, where the status approach is well-established, as
well as Oregon, Mississippi and Florida); Bowman, supra note 143, at 129-32 (describing the
"meretricious relationship" doctrine under Washington state law).
146 Notably, the American Law Institute did not address any legal issues involving third parties
or the government arising during the period of cohabitation or thereafter. See PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.01 cmt. a, at 908 ("Nothing in this Chapter creates
claims against any other persons or the state.").
147 Id. §§ 6.04-6.06. The topics of property distribution and compensatory payments upon dis
solution of marriage are covered in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Principles.
148 See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Famity: A Critique of the American Law Institute's
"Domestic Partners" Proposal, 200] BYUL. REv. 1189, 1204-05 ("Chapter 6 ... rejects contract
and reasonable expectation as the controlling principles for extension of financial protection to non
marital domestic partners, in favor of status.... Thus, it creates a new 'domestic status' -a new
family status in the law.").
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Affirmative status recognition has become available in the United States in
recent years for unmarried cohabitants who reside in jurisdictions with domestic
partnership laws. 149 According to a recent survey, thirty-five municipalities have
enacted domestic partnership ordinances. [SO In addition, five state legislatures, in
Hawaii, Vermont, California, New Jersey and Maine, have enacted domestic part
nership laws with state-wide application. 15l A couple's formal registration as do
mestic partners entitles them to certain legal rights inter se and vis-a-vis third par
ties and the government, which are enumerated in each domestic partnership law.
Most of the enacting jurisdictions are municipalities, where the primary rights
established are employee benefits for public employees with domestic partners,
such as family health benefits. 152 Additional matters within the authority of local
government, such as access to the educational records of a domestic partner's child
and hospital visitation rights for partners, may also be included. [53 The potential
list of legal consequences is more extensive under statutes enacted at the state
level, because the states have broad authority to regulate families. For example, the
Vermont civil union statute extends all of the state law consequences of marriage
to eligible same sex couples. 154 The other state laws are less comprehensive. 155
Like the Vermont civil union law, many other domestic partnership laws, en
acted at both the local and state levels, limit the availability of a formal status for
unmarried cohabitants to same sex couples. [56 The primary rationale for this limita

149Por a discussion of additional aspects of domestic partnership legislation, see infra text ac
companying notes 206-07, 259-64.
150See William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and
Critique, 2001 BYUL. REv. 961,963,965 (reporting the results of an on-line survey).
lSI See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299 (2004); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-l to -7 (1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002). The Hawaii, California
and Vermont legislative proVisions are described in detail in Bowman, supra note 143, at 135-39;
David L. Chambers, For the Best ofFriends andfor Lovers ofAll Sorts: A Status Other than Mar
riage, 76 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 1347,1350-52 (2001). Maine became the most recent state to enact
a domestic partnership law in 2004. See Chapter 672, LD 1579, 121st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Me.
2004), available at
http://janus.state.me.usllegis/ros/lomILOM121stJ15Pub651-700IPub651-70032.htm#P3945_
701030 (amending ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A. § 1-201(l0-A), (lO-B), (17), (20); § 2-102; §
2-103; § 3-203(a)(2), (a)(4); § 5-311(b)(2), (c)(l); § 5-410(a)(3); tit. 22, § 2843-A(l)(B-1),
-A(l)(D), -A(3) (West 2004)) [hereinafter 2004 Maine Domestic Partnership Law].
152 See Duncan, supra note 150, at 974; Bowman & Cornish, supra note 29. at 1194-95.
153 See Duncan, supra note 150, at 974-75.
154 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002), discussed in Duncan, supra note 150, at 963-64.
155 The least comprehensive state domestic partnership status arises under the recent legislation
in Maine, which established certain rights under the state probate code, including inheritance rights
and priority to serve as the guardian or conservator for a partner. See 2004 Maine Domestic Partner
ship Law, supra note 151.
156 See Duncan, supra note 150, at 963-64 (describing eligibility criteria under municipal ordi
nances). At the state level, the Maine domestic partnership statute is fully available to opposite sex
couples. See 2004 Maine Domestic Partnership Law, supra note 151. Under the California and New
Jersey statutes, domestic partnership status is available to opposite sex cohabitants who are at least
sixty-two years old. See CAL. PAM. CODE § 297 (Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (Supp.
2004).
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tion involves the institution of marriage. On the one hand, same sex couples his
torically have been ineligible to marry, and lawmakers attempted to address their
resulting claims for fair and equal treatment by creating a substitute status under
the domestic partnership laws. On the other hand, opposite sex couples already had
the marriage option. Lawmakers who excluded this category of cohabitants from
the domestic partnership laws believed that an alternative status for opposite cou
ples was unnecessary and might denigrate marriage. 157 Given this common restric
tion, along with the limited number of enacting jurisdictions, domestic partnership
laws do not cover the large majority of unmarried, opposite sex couples in the
United States.
Unmarried cohabitants sometimes seek the protection of particular rules of
family law, especially those establishing the rights offamily members against third
parties or the government, through litigation. Although the judicial system has
generally been unreceptive to such claims, unmarried cohabitants have occasion
ally received status recognition in the courts. For example, the state supreme courts
158
in New Jersey and New Mexico have recognized nonmarital cohabitation as a
family relationship whose impairment or loss, caused by the negligent conduct of
another, is compensable. On the other hand, similar claims for tort recovery by
unmarried partners have been uniformly denied by the courts in other states. 159 As
illustrated hy this example from the law of torts, status-based recognition in the
courts occurs on a state-by-state, issue-by-issue basis. The potential list of issues is
extensive, and includes all of the legal consequences associated with the marriage
status.
Congress and the state legislatures have occasionally extended family rights
and duties to unmarried cohabitants in settings where specific legislative goals
would otherwise be jeopardized. For example, most state and federal laws in the
field of domestic violence reach beyond formalized relationships to include unmar
ried cohabitants. 160 In another example, the legislatures in some states have ex
tended the general rule that alimony automatically terminates upon the recipient's
remarriage to include the recipient's entry into a nonmarital cohabiting relation
ship.161 As described in later Suhsections of this Article, these exceptions to the
general rule of nonrecognition for unmarried cohabitation have been driven by pol

157 See generally James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships
to Same Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 649 (1998) (arguing that concerns about the institution
of marriage justify the limitation of municipal domestic partnership laws to same sex couples).
158 See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.l. 1994); Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948 (N.M.
2003).
159 See infra text accompanying notes 284-97 (discussing the treatment of unmarried cohabi
tants under tort doctrines of negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium).
160 See infra text accompanying notes 298-309 (describing reasons for the regulation of un
married cohabitants under domestic violence laws).
161 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. § 3706 (2001); infra text accompanying note 237 (describing
laws governing the impact of a recipient's non-marital cohabitation upon an existing alimony
award).
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icy considerations unique to the specific legislative contexts where the question of
status arises.
The laws of other nations governing the rights and duties of opposite sex co
habitants provide several points of comparison to the body of U.S. law summarized
here. Lawmakers in many countries, at the national and more local levels of gov
ernment, have created a variety of registration systems for unmarried cohabitants.
A smaller number of foreign jurisdictions have legislation establishing an informal
legal status for unmarried partners whose conduct satisfies certain eligibility crite
162
ria. In many cases, these registered and unregistered partnership laws are limited
to same sex cohabitation, especially when the resulting legal status is broad and
marriage-like. l63 The domestic partnership law of the Netherlands constitutes a
major exception to this pattern. Both same sex and opposite sex couples in the
Netherlands can establish registered partnerships that entail nearly all of the same
legal consequences as formal marriage. 164
Opposite sex couples are included more often within foreign domestic part
nership systems that limit the rights and duties associated with partnership status.
The most common benefits involve economic rights between the partners: certain
property rights upon relationship breakdown (the subject matter of the Marvin
case); mutual support obligations; property rights upon the death of the first partner
to die; and mutual responsibility for certain debts. 165 Provisions relating to the abil
ity of partners to care for each other under guardianship and medical consent laws
166
are also common. There is wide variation among the laws of other nations as to
the additional rights and duties selected for inclusion in the domestic partnership
status for opposite sex cohabitants. 167
Thus, many foreign laws impose significant limitations on domestic partner
ship status eligibility for opposite sex cohabitants by restricting the status to same
sex couples, and by excluding nonformalized, unregistered relationships. Further
more, the substantive legal consequences for recognized opposite sex domestic
partners are quite limited in many countries. Still, by comparison to the laws of
many other nations, the legal recognition extended to opposite sex cohabitation as
a significant family relationship in the United States is minimal.

162 See Countries That Recognise, supra note 14 (summarizing laws in Europe, Australia and
Canada that create registered and unregistered cohabitation status doctrines).
153 See Nicole La Violette, Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnership as an
Option for Relationship Recognition Refonn in Canada, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 115,122-27 (2002)
(describing the registered partnership laws in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands
and Quebec).
164 See id. at 126-28; Caroline Forder, European Models ofDomestic Partnership Laws: The
Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371, 393-94 (2000).
165 See Countries That Recognise, supra note 14 (summarizing the legal consequences associ
ated with cohabitation status under laws of other nations); Farder, supra note 164, at 382-94 (same).
166 Countries That Recognise, supra note 14.
167 [d.
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B. Policy Analysis of the Status Issue

Family status recognition for spouses and for parents and children results in
the legal regulation of many aspects of these family relationships. The goals of
such regulation focus on the protection of individual members and the support and
preservation of the family unit, both of which benefit the larger society. Thus, for
example, the financial support duties owed by spouses to each other and owed by
parents to their children operate to protect the financially dependent members of
the family. The assignment of responsibility in this manner within the family also
reinforces the economic integration of the family, and relieves the state of primary
financial responsibility for dependent citizens. 168
Other doctrines accomplish important family-related purposes by regulating
third parties and the state as they deal with the family. For example, the testimonial
privileges established for married couples prevent the state from forcing one
spouse to testify against the other in court proceedings, even though the testimony
would be otherwise relevant and admissible. 169 In this manner, the marriage rela
tionship is strengthened, and a larger societal interest in strong families is pro
moted. Numerous legal regulations are similarly premised on the existence offam
ily status relationships.
In recent years, questions have been raised about the traditional limitation of
such status-based regulation to the so-called "nuclear family," consisting of a mar
ried couple and their cornmon children. The large number of individuals making
other choices about the structure of their families puts pressure on lawmakers and
policymakers to consider extending the coverage of the family laws. Within this
context, the question of recognition arises as to the many families in the United
States today that are headed by unmarried, opposite sex couples.
Many proponents of family law reform believe that the essential purposes of
family regulation cannot be fully accomplished when "family" is defined in law to
exclude a significant part of the population of actual families. 170 Thus, for example,

168 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.02 cmt. b,
at 915 (describing the objectives of the ALI's recent proposal to extend the property and support
rights of spouses to certain categories of unmarried cohabitants at the time of relationship dissolu
tion, as follows: "The most important objective of this [proposal] is just resolution of the economic
claims of ... domestic partners. The [proposal] also advances, as a secondary objective, the fair
allocation of responsibilities between individuals and society.").
169 See KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 78-86 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999). The privilege is not available to unmarried cohabitants. See Jennifer R. Brannen,
Unmarried With Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same Sex Couples, 17 THE REv.
LmG. 311, 315-24 (1998); Annotation, Communication Between Unmarried Couple Living To
gether As Privileged, 4 A.L.R. 4th 422 (1981 & Supp. 2004) (collecting cases). Professor Milton C.
Regan, Jr. considered the possibility of extending the privilege to unmarried cohabitants, and con
cluded that such a change in the law would be unwise. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Com
mitment: The Legal Treatment ofMarriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1435, 1459
(2001).
170 See Blumberg, supra note 133, at 1265 n.4 (collecting authorities that suppon status recog
nition for unmarried cohabitants); Westfall, supra note 143, at 1477 n.70 (same). The increase in the
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Professor 1. Thomas Oldham expressed concern about the dependent members in
families headed by unmarried cohabitants, where the partners have common chil
dren and assume family roles that result in career damage to one partner. 171 Ac
cording to Oldham, the failure to assign responsibility between the partners or to
impose obligations on third parties, based on the existence of such adult relation
ships, can easily result in economic hardship when the career partner becomes un
available through death or separation. 172 According to this viewpoint, legal recog
nition for unmarried couples, whose families involve economic and emotional in
terdependency, would promote the goals of protecting dependent individuals, sup
porting the family unit, and furthering the state interest in healthy, stable fami
lies. 173
The agenda of reform that would recognize and regulate unmarried cohabiting
relationships in the law remains largely unaccomplished. The following Subsec
tions of this Article describe several public policy considerations that have shaped
the current laws governing unmarried cohabitation between opposite sex partners.
The concern about protecting de facto family members, addressed by Professor
Oldham, plays an important role. Additional considerations include concerns about
the institution of marriage, concerns about certainty as to family status, the mean
ing and role of autonomy for unmarried cohabitants, and the formidable challenges
involved in actually formulating a new family status. Unfortunately for the propo
nents of reform, these additional considerations often counsel against status recog
nition for opposite sex cohabitants. Generally speaking, the clash of policies in this
number of other "nontraditional" family relationships, besides the relationship of unmarried cohabi
tants, has also raised questions about the wisdom of limiting legal recognition to legal parent-child
and spousal relationships. See, e.g., PRINClPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DlSSOLUTION. supra note 6, §
2.04(1), at 134 (proposing broad equitable and estoppel doctrines to identify legally significant
adult-child relationships beyond the traditional biological and adoptive parent-child relationships);
MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW (1994) (discussing the treatment of steppar
ent-child relationships in the law); Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Needfor Legal Alternatives When the Premise ofthe Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Par
enthood to Meet the Needs ofChildren in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. LJ. 459 (1990).
171 See J. Thomas Oldham, Lessonsfrom Jerry Hall v. MickJagger Regarding U.S. Regulation
of Heterosexual Cohabitation Or, Can't Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1409,
1426-32 (2001).
172 See id. at 1426-29.
173 For example, Professor David L. Chambers highlighted the following purpose and scope of
the family laws, in the context of his proposal to create a new legal status for registered pairs of
"designated friends":
Among the functions of government in relation to its citizens, few are more significant
than its role as facilitator, its role in helping citizens live satisfying lives as they define
them. Governments have long adopted this stance in relation to married persons....
[The many legal consequences of marriage] have been undertaken, not in order to en
courage people to marry, but in order to make life easier for those who do.... Govern
ments should facilitate unmarried individuals' relationships much as it facilitates there
lationships of married couples.
Chambers, supra note 151, at 1354-55.
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field has generated little recognition to date of unmarried cohabitation as a legal
family status in the U.S. family law system.
C. Policy Considerations Relating to Marriage

The heart of the modern debate over recognizing unmarried cohabitation as a
legal status for opposite sex couples has to do with the institution of marriage. Op
ponents fear that establishing an informal legal status for couples who are eligible
to marry will undermine marriage as a key social, cultural and legal institution, to
the detriment of society. The California Supreme Court expressed this viewpoint in
the case of Elden v. Sheldon, 174 which denied an unmarried cohabitant's claim for
damages against the individual whose negligence caused the death of the claim
ant's partner, as follows:
[T]he state has a strong interest in the marriage relationship; to the
extent unmarried cohabitants are granted the same rights as married
persons, the state's interest in promoting marriage is inhibited....
. . . Our emphasis on the state's interest in promoting the mar
riage relationship is not based on anachronistic notions of morality.
The policy favoring marriage is "rooted in the necessity of provid
ing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.,,175
Professor Ann Laquer Estin has described the cumulative effect of numerous judi
cial decisions like the decision in Elden: "One result of the fear that cohabitation
will encroach further on marriage is that the courts have largely taken themselves
out of the process of creating broader social norms to govern nonmarital relation
ships." 176
The traditional concern about the impact of unmarried cohabitation on the in
stitution of marriage, reflected in the Elden opinion, begins with two related as
sumptions. The first assumption is that marriage is a critical social institution,
whose enhancement is an important goal of the legal system. The second, related
assumption is that the legal recognition of unmarried cohabitation would detract
from the institution of marriage, as a practical matter and also on a symbolic level.

174 Elden

v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586-587 (Cal. 1988).
at 587 (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339,341 (Iowa 1983)).
176 Ann Laquer Estin. Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381, 1408 (2001).
175 1d.
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1. Marriage as an Important Institution
Marriage has long been regarded in our Anglo-American tradition as a cru
cially important social, cultural, religious and legal institution. Stated broadly, the
marriage relationship introduces order into society through the establishment of
discrete family units, where personal and financial relationships can be defined and
developed, and children safely reared. I?? In the oft-quoted words ofthe 1887 opin
ion of the United States Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill, "[marriage] is an insti
tution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for
it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be nei
ther civilization nor progress.,,178 The Supreme Court and the lower courts, Con
gress and the state legislatures, politicians on the campaign trail, and public opin
ion have all relied on this common understanding about marriage in addressing
important family issues. I ?9
Although the times may be changing, the key rationale for a continuing pref
erence in the law for marriage appears to remain constant: Marriage is regarded by
most individuals as the most certain, stable method for creating the lasting families
that will serve their personal needs, 180 and maintain order in society. Marriage re
mains an important aspect of the social and cultural heritage of most Americans. 181
177 See James C. Dobson, Marriage [s the Foundation of the Family, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 1,1 (2004) (referring to "society's most vital and primary institution-the
family, founded upon and nurtured by marriage"); Maggie Gallagher, What [s Marriage For? The
Public Purpose of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REv. 773, 781 (2002) ("[W]hat every known human
society calls marriage shares certain basic, recognizable features, including most especially the privi
leges accorded to the reproductive couple in order to protect both the interests of children and the
interests of society."); Lynne Marie Kohm, Marriage and the Intact Family: The Significance of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 22 WHmIER L. REV. 327 (2000).
178 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,211 (1887). A recent Lexis search returned thirty-five judi
cial opinions that include the language from Maynard quoted in the text, and fifty-seven cases that
rely upon the proposition contained therein.
179 See, e.g., Wendell E. Primus & Jennifer Beeson, Safety Net Programs, Marriage, and Co
habitation, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPUCATIONS OFCOHABITATlON ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND
SOCIAL POUCY 191, 218 (Alan Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002) ("[Bloth conservatives and
progressives rconcerned with the formulation of federal welfare policy] ... understand that marriage
remains a highly valued and desired status for a [sic] most Americans.").
180 See generally GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133, § 2.01, at 21 ("A significant majority of
Americans ... still regard marriage as an important part of their life plan."); LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 183 (2000) ("Marriage remains a strong, personal
goal. Ninety-four percent of college freshmen in one 1997 survey said they personally hoped to get
married.").
181 The current debate within the gay and lesbian community about the desirability of extend
ing the legal marriage status to same sex couples has provided an opportunity to analyze the signifi
cance of marriage in the modern context. Proponents of same sex marriage take the position that
marriage is the most significant and respected adult family status in our society. According to this
viewpoint, the availability of alternative status options, such as the civil union status established by
statute in Vermont, does not meet the same needs. See, e.g.. Barbara J. Cox, But "Why Not Marriage:

An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25
VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); Tamar Lewin, For Better or Worse: Marriage's Stormy Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, Week In Review at 4 ("For many homosexuals as well as heterosexuals, a
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In their eyes, and in the eyes of the law, marriage is the status designed to last "til
death." For the lawmakers and policymakers confronted with calls to recognize and
approve of unmarried cohabitation as an alternative legal status, history and tradi
tion are strong forces resisting such change. 182
The tendency of lawmakers and members of the public to look to marriage as
a major stabilizing force in society has been particularly intense in recent years.
During this period, many social problems in the United States, including those as
sociated with poverty and crime, have resisted repeated public and private institu
tional efforts to solve them. At the same the time, the rates of divorce, unmarried
cohabitation, and birth of children to unmarried parents have been relatively high.
Some observers, who see a connection between unyielding social problems and the
demographic data, conclude that the solution to difficult social problems is the
creation and maintenance of more stable, married families.
Various legislative initiatives have been motivated by this pro-marriage
agenda. As an example, recent efforts to toughen state divorce laws by returning to
fault-based grounds for divorce183 have been premised in part on a belief that di
vorce reform will stabilize marriage. The proponents of these reforms further assert
that longer-lasting marriages will, in turn, solve many social ills. 184 Thus, The New
York Times in 1996 reported the following statement by the legislative representa
tive who introduced a proposal to establish fault grounds in contested cases of di
vorce in Michigan:
The sponsor of the Michigan bill ... said people "must begin to see
the connection between divorce and other problems," especially
poverty and juvenile delinquency.

civil union, a commitment ceremony or a registered partnership simply lacks the emotional, psycho
logical and spiritual weight that centuries of tradition added to marriage."). On the other hand, op
ponents of same sex marriage within the gay and lesbian community highlight the hierarchical and
repressive features of the traditional marriage status, and state a preference for alternative legal
status options. See generally Blumberg, supra note 133, at 1275-76 (citing sources on both sides of
the debate); Chambers, supra note 136, at 451-52 (citing sources critical of same sex marriage).
182 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. 1. Soc. POL'y &L. 239, 246 (2001)
("[M] arriage continues to be uncritically central to our thinking about the family. What is bizarre is
that it remains central in spite of the fact that the traditional marital family has become a statistical
minority of family units in our society.") (citing 2000 U.S. Census data).
183 See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 590 (2d ed.
2002) ("A movement is afoot to reintroduce fault in the dissolution process. Since 1997,25 states
have considered laws to repeal or revise their no-fault laws.").
184 See generally James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. LJ. 875,905-34
(2000) (placing "the divorce counterrevolution" in historical context, and describing the emphasis
on children's welfare in the current movement to reinstate fault divorce laws); Lynn D. Wardle,
Divorce Reform at the Tum of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 784
n.5 (2000) (collecting authors who "critici[zed] ... the existing regime of unilateral no-fault divorce
in professional and scholarly journals and in popular media").
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... [S]he pointed to numerous studies that have found that
children of divorce are far more likely to become sexually active,
use drugs and fare poorly in schooL 185
Predictably, critics have questioned the assumptions made here that a change in the
divorce laws would affect the divorce rate, and that the absence of married parents
in the home is the cause of the identified social problems. 186 Such important ques
tions aside, however, the shape of this public debate about grounds for marriage
termination undeniably illustrates the current emphasis on enacting laws to
strengthen the institution of marriage.
At the federal level, a recent reform of the federal income tax law, designed to
reduce the so-called "marriage penalty,"187 illustrates the same concern about for
mulating rules of law that strengthen marriage. Prior to the recent reform, the in
come tax bill for many married couples who filed joint tax returns was higher than
the total amount they would have paid if they were unmarried and filed two single
taxpayer returns. In 2001 and 2003, Congress adjusted relevant provisions of the
tax code in order to reduce the unseemly financial penalty associated with mar
188
riage.
In doing so, Congress acted out of concern for the institution of marriage.
Thus, one representative spoke in support of the income tax reform, as follows:
The current tax code punishes American couples by penalizing them
with a higher tax bracket for entering into marriage. This policy is
wrong and discourages individuals from entering into society's most
basic institution. Congress should advocate policies that strengthen
families .... 189

185 Dirk Johnson, Attacking No-Fault Notion, Conservatives Try to Put Blame Back in Di
vorce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at AlO (quoting Michigan legislator Jesse Dallman).
186 See Wardle, supra note 184, at 784 nA (collecting sources that criticize the reform move
ment).
187 The amendments to the Internal Revenue Code reducing the marriage penalty were part of
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001), and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752 (2003). See Standard Deduction ofJoint Filers Increased, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of2003: LAW, EXPLANATION & ANALYSIS (CCH) I (2003) [hereinafter Standard
Deduction].
188 See Standard Deduction, supra note 187, at 1-3 (explaining how Congress addressed the
marriage penalty by making two major changes in the tax law: an increase in the standard deduction
for couples filing jointly, along with upward adjustments to the income levels at which higher tax
rates are applied for married couples). Notably, the marriage penalty refonns are temporary and will
end in 2010, unless Congress extends them. See Effective Dates, Jobs and Growth Tax ReliefRec
onciliation Act of2003, LAW, EXPLANATION & ANALYSIS (CCH) 1 (2003).
189
147 CONGo REc. 1046 (June 7,2001) (statement of Rep. McIntyre). See generally Primus &
Beeson, supra note 179 (assessing other federal laws to determine the extent of marriage incentives
or disincentives).
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In a similar manner, Congress has focused attention on marriage incentives in the
enactment of federal welfare laws. 190
The Congressional testimony accompanying the marriage penalty tax reform,
quoted above, emphasized the importance of marriage without providing specific
reasons for its premier and protected place in the law. In a similar manner, much of
the traditional rhetoric about marriage is premised on the broad and widely
accepted notion that marriage is an essential social and legal institution. By way of
contrast, a body of recent scholarship has attempted to identify and analyze more
191
specific reasons for preferring and privileging marriage in the law.
For example, in a recent article by federal policy analyst Ron Haskins, the au
thor stated a clear preference for marriage, based on a utilitarian concern about the
wellbeing of children, especially in poor farnilies. l92 Haskins, of the Brookings In
stitution, expressed the view that the best family environment for children is the
two-biologicaI-parent, married family. In support of this position, he first cited the
widely known studies that indicate negative outcomes for children reared in single
parent homes. As to families headed by unmarried, cohabiting parents, Haskins
observed that, "[n]ow researchers are beginning to find, although the evidence is
not yet very strong, that the effects of cohabiting, as compared with being reared
by two married biological parents, are also bad for children.,,193 In light of this data
about single-parent and cohabiting-parent families, Haskins reached the following
conclusion:

190 See Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro-Marriage Moral Dis
course of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (2004); Phoebe G. Silag, Note, To
Have, To Hold, To Receive Public Assistance: TANF and Marriage Promotion Policies, 7 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 413 (2003) (criticizing the use offederal welfare funds to promote marriage
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act [PRWORA] of 1996,
and under the law extending PRWORA through the year 2008); Courtney Janchow & Jack Tweedie,
Welfare and Wedding Vows: Some Legislatures Want to Use Welfare Funds to Strengthen Mar
riages; Others Have Questions, Brief Article, STATE LEGIS., Apr. 1,2003, at 24 (describing the use
of federal welfare funds in various state programs designed to promote marriage).
19\ See William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non
Marital Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REv. 1001, 1005-13 (2003) (summarizing numerous empirical
studies that found a higher incidence of certain undesirable conditions and behaviors in unmarried
cohabiting relationships, as compared to marriage, such as violence, poverty, depression, and infi
delity); Wardle, supra note 148, at 1224-26 (same); Gallagher, supra note 177, at 777-78 (summa
rizing and analyzing numerous empirical studies which compared marriage and cohabitation); Nor
val Glenn, Is the Current Concern About American Marriage Warranted?, 9VA. J. SOC. POL'y &L.
5, 15 (citing research studies "compar[ing] the estimated effects of marriage and non-marital cohabi
tation on well-being").
192 See Ron Haskins. Federal Social Policy, Cohabitation, and Marriage, in JUST LIVING
TOGETHER: IMPUCAnONS OF COHABITAnON ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL POllCY 229 (Alan
Booth & Nan C. Crouter eds.. 2002).
193Id. at 230. See also Renata Forste, Prelude to Marriage or Alternative to Marriage? A So
cial Demographic Look at Cohabitation in the United States, 4 J. L. & F AM. STUD. 91, 94 (citing
research supporting the position that "[tJhe well-being of children in cohabiting unions is generally
worse than that of children in married couple families").
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If social science research is taken seriously, one can conclude that,
on average, America's children have more mental health problems,
learn less in school, drop out of school earlier, engage in teen sex
earlier and more often, get pregnant as teens more often, and are in
volved in more crimes than they would if a higher percentage of
them were being reared by both of their natural, married parents. 194
Another effort to provide more specific justification for the marriage prefer
ence appears in a recent law review article by Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
where the author emphasized the stability of marriage relationships as compared to
unmarried cohabiting relationships. 195 Regan relied upon empirical studies demon
strating that marriage is more likely to survive until the death of one party, or at
least for a longer period of time, compared to the unmarried cohabiting relation
ship. The primary value Regan assigned to this aspect of stability involves the per
sonal benefit to committed marriage partners. According to Regan, "[t]he ability to
make and keep commitments is critical to the unity of the self over time,,,196 and
"marriage offers a reasonably coherent set of expectations and traditions about
commitment that aids in the construction of a narrative identity both for each part
ner and for the couple together.,,197
Regan acknowledged:
Some uncertainty exists about the extent to which these differences
[between levels of stability in marriage and cohabiting relationships]
reflect the fact that those who are less committed are attracted to co
habitation, as opposed to cohabitation itself shaping attitudes about
the desirability and feasibility of permanence and commitment in in
timate relationships.,,198
The additional question arises, whether the phenomenon of less stability in cohab
iting relationships is actually related in a circular manner to the law's denigration

194Haskins, supra note 192, at 230. Haskins proposed a federal policy agenda with the follow
ing purpose: "to increase the number of children being reared by their married biological parents
and to discourage all other family forms, especially among the poor." [d. To this end, the author
assessed the financial incentives regarding family formation built into the TANF, Medicaid, Food
Stamp. housing assistance, and child support enforcement programs, and the Earned Income Tax
Credit provisions of the federal income tax laws.
195 See Regan, supra note 169, at 1439-46. See also Duncan, supra note L50, at 991 (stating
that the relationship stability associated with marriage does not extend to the relationships estab
lished by couples under state and local domestic partnership laws).
196 Reagan, supra note L69, at 1443.
197 [d. at 1445.
198 !d. at 1440. See also Estin, supra note 176, at 1386 ("Marriage may appear more stable
than cohabitation because individuals in less promising relationships today choose nol to marry.").
See Generally Duncan. supra note 191, at 10 IS ("It is difficult, ifnot impossible, for the research to
establish causation [as to various negative qualities of cohabitation, including relationship instabil
ity], so we must generally settle for association.").
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of the unmanied status. 199 Whatever the proper limitations on his analysis may be,
Regan's emphasis on the personal benefits derived from stability in maniage repre
sents an important attempt to explain the maniage preference in terms other than
the historical and traditional norms of society.
While the premier place of maniage in law and society is widely accepted,
there are dissenters. For example, Professor Martha Albertson Fineman has taken
the position that the central role of maniage in the regulation of families effectively
prevents the formulation of wise policies in the modem context. 200 According to
Fineman,
[W]e are making certain assumptions about the capabilities and ca
pacities of marriage as distinguished from other relationships in so
ciety-assumptions about its unique ability to accomplish certain
societal functions .
. . . The concept of marriage, and the assumptions it carries with it,
limit development of family policy and distort our ideology?OI

Fineman proposed eliminating the legal maniage status, and relying upon other
established doctrines to regulate adult family relationships.202
The question posed by Fineman, whether maniage should continue as a legal
institution, has not been widely debated. The value of maniage as a legal and so
cial institution continues to be accepted without question by most people. The is
sue that receives more attention in current discourse about family regulation is
whether the time has come to create an alternative legal status for couples who do
not marry.203 An important part of the analysis, explored in the next Subsection, is
whether such recognition in the case of opposite sex couples would somehow harm
the highly regarded institution of maniage.

199 See Forste, supra note 193, at 101 ("Given the tentative nature ofcohabiting relationships,
changing family policy in support of this type of family fonn could potentially increase its stabil
ity."); Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families, 22
GA. L. REV. 851, 886 (1988) ("The degree of legal recognition that various relationships attain is
likely to affect their stability and individuals' sense of satisfaction within them.").
200 See Fineman, supra note 182.
201 Id. at 244.
202 !d. at 259-68.
203 See, e.g., Bowman & Cornish, supra note 29, at 1180-84 (exploring the following tradi
tional rationales for preferring marriage in the law, and concluding that other legal adult status rela
tionships could perfonn the same functions: "to provide an appropriate unit for procreation and
rearing of children, avoid public charges, ... support public morals, [and] provide stability").
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2. Does the Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation Undermine Marriage?
The desirability of marriage as a stable institution in society, and the desire of
lawmakers to encourage stable families, leaves unanswered an important question
in the modem debate about unmarried cohabitation. That is, why must marriage
exist as the exclusive heterosexual union providing the basis for this type of stable
family unit? The traditional analysis of this issue assumes that the recognition of a
"marriage alternative" would automatically devalue marriage, to the detriment of
individuals and society.204 This viewpoint was expressed in the opinion of the Cali
fornia Supreme Court in the case of Elden v. Sheldon, quoted above, where the
court stated: "To the extent unmarried cohabitants are granted the same rights [in
tort law] as married persons, the state's interest in promoting marriage is inhib
ited.,,205
This viewpoint was recently reiterated by a scholar who studied and critiqued
the growing number of local and state domestic partnership laws, which extend
6
legal recognition and specified benefits to unmarried couples.2° The author, Wil
liam C. Duncan, concluded that domestic partnership legislation constitutes bad
public policy, because the creation of an alternative status detracts from the value
of marriage, as follows:
Another obvious policy implication of domestic partnership laws is
the effect on the preferred status of marriage in society. Society has
traditionally conferred special benefits only to marriage because of
its unique contribution not only to each participant but to the larger
community.... When the benefits traditionaIly reserved for married
couples are extended to other couples based on a nonmarital status,

204 A similar concern, that legal recognition of nonformalized relationships would undermine
the fonnal marriage status, also supported the repeal of common law marriage doctrines in many
U.S. jurisdictions, beginning in the late nineteenth century. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist
Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 736-37, 743-44 (1996)
(documenting the "underlying assumption, or fear, that ... an alternative institution like common
law marriage might prove more attractive than formal marriage, thus beginning a process leading to
the destruction of social institutions as they currently existed").
In the case of non-marital cohabitation in the modem context, the increase in cohabitation,
even without substantial legal recognition for such relationships, has been identified as a threat to
the institution of marriage. See Pamela Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary
North America, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ONFAMll...IES, CHll...DREN
AND SOCIAL POLICY 53, 53 (Alan Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002) ("[S]ome interpret cohabita
tion as a manifestation of a serious retreat in marriage-that is, that cohabitation is symptomatic of,
and reinforces, a decline in the centrality of marriage as the foundation of family life."); Glenn, su
pra note 191, at 30 ("[W]hereas there is little hard evidence that shows that the increase in cohabita
tion in this country has been distinctly detrimental to the institution of marriage, there are reasons
for thinking it has been.").
205 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,586 (Cal. 1988), quoted supra text accompanying note
175.
206 See Duncan, supra note 150.
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the obvious implication is that the law no longer considers marriage
to be the uniquely valuable institution that it has been. 207

The perceived harms to marriage flowing from status recognition for cohabi
tants are twofold. The first type of harm relates to the didactic function of the law.
Many rules of law, including those establishing marriage as the exclusive adult
family status, send a clear message about the value placed by society on marriage
as an institution. In this sense, the preference in the law for marriage illustrates the
general observation made by Professor Mary Ann Glendon that "[m]uch of family
law is no more-and no less-than the symbolic expression of certain cultural ide
als. ,,208 Adding the alternative legal status of unmarried cohabitation may be seen
as weakening the positive message about marriage in the law,z09
The second type of harm to marriage anticipated by the critics of status recog
nition for unmarried cohabitants is related to the first, and involves the role of the
law in shaping private behavior. 210 The concern here is that a legal alternative to
marriage may be so attractive, on multiple levels, that more couples will choose

2071d. at 990. Professor Lynn D. Wardle made the same type of observation about the ALI's
proposal to recognize unmarried cohabitation as a significant legal status in Chapter 6 ofthePrinci
pIes of the Law ofFamily Dissolution. According to Wardle:
The problem with creating a new domestic status is that it could undermine the institu
tion of marriage, which has been the exclusive domestic relationship of adults in Anglo
American law for centuries.... This issue was not considered by the AU, and chapter 6
should not be adopted in any state until that matter has been carefully examined and un
til it is clear that creating domestic partnership [sic] will not detrimentally impact the in
tegrity of the institution of marriage.
Wardle, supra note 148, at 1206-07. See also Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and
Recognition ofDomestic Partnerships Affect Marriage? 4 lL. & FAM. STUD. 105, 115 (2002) ("The
domestic partnerships and relationships formed by cohabitation promoted by the ALI's Principles
For Family Dissolution in Chapter 6 will downgrade marriage, and will dilute and weaken mar
riage.").
208 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 10 (1987). See also Sean
E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value ofthe Law in Shaping Social Perspectives on Marriage,
3 lL. & F AM. STUD. 23, 28-30 (2001); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function ofSuccession Law
and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion. 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1100 (1999) ("It is a truism that
the law teaches as it governs. The law has great potential to teach and reinforce the values that
ground it or appear to ground it."). The analysis oflaws in terms oftheir expressive and nonnative
functions is not limited to the field offarnily law. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories
ofLaw: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PENN. L. REv. 1363, 1374 (2000) (providing "a general analy
sis and assessment of expressive theories of law").
209 See Chambers, supra note 151, at 1357 ("One ofthe principal objections to creating a new
status is likely to be that, by giving couples, particularly cohabiting couples, a choice of statuses,
marriage will lose some of its luster."). See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Le
gal Regulation ofMarriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1901, 1943 (2000) (,,[AJnother development that has
influenced the social meaning of marriage is the legal recognition of non-marital cohabitation rela
tionships" under the existing contract law and equitable doctrines applied at the time of relationship
termination).
210 See generally Primus & Beeson. supra note 179. at 196 ("In fact, it may be that the mes
sages that the law sends [in the context of federal welfare and tax programs for poor families 1about
how society views marriage are as important as the actual effect on marriage rates.").

[2005]

FORCES SHAPING THE LAW OF COHABITATION

175

cohabitation over marriage.
On one level, the didactic messages of the law may themselves influence pri
vate decisions about marriage. Thus, the current preference in the law for marriage,
especially when combined with similar preferences expressed by other social and
religious institutions, may encourage couples to marry. Conversely, recognition of
2l1
cohabitation in the family law system may have the opposite effect.
On another level, the legal recognition of unmarried cohabitation may also in
fluence private decisions against marriage for more practical reasons. Specifically,
the current package of legal rights and obligations that constitute the marriage
status may be an incentive for some couples to marry. The alternative package of
legal consequences associated with a newly created cohabitation status might be
more attractive to certain couples, and encourage them to forego marriage.
Whether the legal recognition of cohabitation would in fact encourage more
couples to forego marriage is a highly speculative matter. The answer may depend
in part upon the actual rights and duties that would be assigned to such a status.
More importantly, the answer depends on the decisionmaking process employed by
couples choosing between cohabitation and marriage. Within this private deci
sionmaking framework, legal status consequences are likely to be just one of sev
eral considerations shaping the decisions of many couples. 212 Still, the behavior
shaping effect of reform is an important aspect of the policy assessment of propos
als to recognize unmarried cohabitation as a legal alternative to marriage. 213
211 See Chambers, supra note 151, at 1358 ("[c]onsidering this feared impact [resulting from a
new status] on the incidence of marriage"). See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND
THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 178 (1993) ("Preferences are not exogenous to law, but in fact can be
shaped by it.").
212 The same question about the impact of the law governing cohabitants' rights upon private
marriage decisions has arisen in other nations, where domestic partnership registration laws create a
more legally significant alternative for unmarried, opposite sex cohabitants than is generally avail
able in the United States. Thus, for example, "there are some worries in Sweden amongst academics
about the relationship between the [legislation creating certain property rights for unmarried cohabi
tants] and the [decreasedl rate of marriage. To obtain a decisive answer specific research would have
to be carried oUL" Forder, supra note 164, at 379-80 (citations omitted).
Professor Forder also discussed possible legal incentives to choose cohabitation over marriage
under the law of the Netherlands, which establishes a registered partnership status involving most of
the legal consequences associated with marriage. See id. at 393-94. The major differences under the
registered partnership law involve the informal dissolution procedure which functions as a counter
part to divorce for registered partners, and fewer rights of parenthood vis-a-vis a partner's child./d.
Forder speculated that the avoidance of divorce may operate as an incentive for couples to forego
marriage. [d. at 394. The author also offered an alternative explanation. "that these couples wished
to make a symbolic rejection of marriage." [d.
213 Legal philosophers have considered the extent to which rules of law influence private deci
sionmaking in the family context. For example, Professor Carl Schneider has written about "the
channeling function" of law, whereby "the law recruits, builds. shapes, sustains, and promotes social
institutions [,]" including marriage. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law,
20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495, 496 (1992). He described several techniques whereby the law "channel[s]
people into institutions." These techniques include "simply ... recognizing and endorsing institu
tions." "reward[ing] participation in an institution," and "disfavoring competing institutions." !d. at
503. See generally Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions ofFamily Law, 22 D.C. DAvISL.
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A threshold question arises in considering the behavior-shaping function of
family laws in this context. Namely, do couples even know about the rules of law
that define the marriage status and the unmarried cohabiting relationship so differ
ently? If the answer is no, then private marriage decisions will not be influenced by
214
the law.
Writing in 1984, Professor William Reppy took the position that the rules of
law establishing unmarried cohabitation as a negative status at that time, such as
the criminal cohabitation laws and the judicial refusal to enforce contracts between
215
cohabitants, probably had little impact on couples' decisions to cohabit. He
based this position in large part upon an assumption that many people were un
aware of the relevant rules of law. Reppy also speculated that this assumption
might cease to be accurate at some point in the future "as more persons learn about
the actual governing law .... ,,216
At a minimum, most adults today probably know that marriage entails numer
ous legal consequences not associated with unmarried cohabitation, even if the
details are sketchy. As to the detailed rules of law, the level of public familiarity is
likely to be quite variable. On the one hand, it seems unlikely that most citizens
understand (or have ever given a moment's thought to) the rule of the Elden v.
Sheldon case, described above,217 whereby a spouse but not a cohabiting partner is
entitled to tort damages based on the negligent injury of the other partner. By way
of contrast, many people are familiar with the substantive and procedural rules
governing the termination of marriage, because divorce affects many families and
is widely discussed in public forums.
The media are an important source of public information about particular fam
ily law issues, frequently in the form of feature coverage when interesting cases
arise. Thus, public awareness about the obscure rule of the Elden case would in
crease if, for example, a lawsuit was brought by a famous entertainer based on the
injury to his or her unmarried partner, and the story was reported by The New York
Times, 60 Minutes, and MTV. Such media coverage would result in public educa
tion about tort law doctrines and the rights of unmarried couples thereunder. The
media routinely inform the public about significant changes in the law, such as the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, which
REv. 991, 991 (1989) ("suggest[ingJ that expressive or symbolic aspects oflaw should be used in
the field of family law to guide people to better behavior").
214 See generally Weisbrod, supra note 213, at 999 ("Assuming there is a law, or rule of law
that can be known accurately in principle, we confront the problem of whether it is known in fact.").
215 See Reppy, supra note 4, at 1682.
2161d. at 1684. See also Westfall, supra note 143, at 1470 (criticizing the proposed status for
unmarried cohabitants under the ALI's Principles ofthe Law ofFamity Dissolution because, inter
alia, "non-marital cohabitants may fail to realize ... that their relationship carries the potential for
major legal consequences ...."). But see Oldham, supra note 171, at 1422-23 (criticizing the ALI
proposal on the ground that the proposed "trial period," during which no legal consequences would
attach in most cases, would encourage "strategic behavior" to avoid economic obligations to a part
ner).
217 Elden v. Sheldon. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), discussed supra text accompanying notes
174-75, and infra at text accompanying notes 267-70, 284-91.
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218

invalidated the criminal sodomy statute in the state of Texas. Predictably, the
219
enactment of Chapter 6 of the ALI's Principles ofthe Law ofDissolution by the
legislature in a given state would draw media attention to the economic issues af
fecting unmarried couples living there. These are matters of general interest for
many people, whether or not they are personally affected by them.
Even assuming knowledge of the law, a question remains whether the differ
ent treatment of marriage partners and unmarried cohabitants actually influences
marriage decisions in many cases. The traditional rhetoric associated with the law
of marriage and unmarried cohabitation has long answered this question in the af
firmative. However, identifying the bases on which couples actually choose be
tween marriage and unmarried cohabitation is not such a simple matter. The rea
sons why couples who are eligible to marry choose to live together instead are
surely numerous and varied, and different legal consequences may be just one of
· many cases. 220
severa1 f actors III
First, some individuals are ideologically opposed to marriage, based on con
cerns about their own autonomy or concerns about historical and current discrimi
nation in the marriage laws. 221 Other individuals may not be averse to marriage in
the abstract, but may not be sure enough about a current partner to make a lifelong
commitment. Thus, many cohabiting relationships are trial periods before the cou
ple makes a fini'll decision whether to marry.222 In other cases, one partner may be
waiting to see whether the other will make changes that will enhance marriageabil
223
ity, such as addressing an addiction or getting ajob. For most people, marriage
entails a lifelong commitment, made in the presence of family and community
(and, maybe, God), which requires a certainty about the other person not required
at the outset of an informal cohabitation.
On the other hand, couples who decide to marry may be influenced by a con
verse set of reasons unrelated to the law. They may believe in marriage as an ideo
logical or religious matter, and they may feel very certain about each other as life
long mates. Within this decisionmaking framework, the difference in legal defini
tion between marriage and cohabitation may be an additional factor influencing
marriage decisions in some cases.
218 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), discussed in Helen Kennedy, Supremes Lift Sod
omy Ban. Gays Cheer, Conservatives Seethe, N.Y. DAlLY NEWS, June 27, 2003, at 5; Steven C.
Price, Editorial, Lawrence v. Texas: What Was Overlooked, WASH. POST, July II, 2003, at A20; Joe
Klein, How the Supremes Redeemed Bush, TIME, July 7, 2003, available at
http://www.time.com/-time/columnistlkleinlarticle/0.9565.461823.OO.html (last visited July 8,
2004).
219 PRlNCIPLES OFTIffi LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, ch. 6 (proposing that quali
fied cohabitants receive the rights of divorcing spouses at the time of relationship dissolution).
220 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.02 cmt. a, at 914
("Domestic partners fail to marry for diverse reasons."); DORIAN SOLOT & MARSHALL MILLER,
UNMARRIED To EACH OTHER 250 (2002); WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 180, at 42-43; Cham
bers, supra note 151, at 1359; Blumberg, supra note 133, at 1296.
221 See Estin, supra note 176, at 1386-87; Chambers, supra note 136, at 450-52.
222 See Chambers, supra note 151, at 1359.
223 See Estin, supra note 176, at 1387-88.
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Recently, scholars have looked to the experience of the past few decades,
when the rate of cohabitation in the United States increased dramatically, for help
in answering this question about the impact of differential rules of law on marriage
and cohabitation decisions. They have reached no consensus about the significance
of the past for predicting the future.
On the one hand, Professor Ann Laquer Estin characterized the past few dec
ades as a time when the number of unmarried cohabitants increased dramatically,
224
in spite of the denial of legal recognition. She therefore concluded that the im
pact of the law on marriage/cohabitation decisions is insignificant:
Those who believe that law is a useful tool for shaping family be
havior sometimes argue for maintaining a strong distinction between
cohabitation and marriage in order to channel couples into marriage.
The experience of the past quarter century, however, is not encour
aging on this front. With more than four million cohabiting couples
in the United States today, the law's failure to address cohabitation
is increasingly difficult to justify?25
Professor J. Thomas Oldham reached a less certain conclusion about the sig
nificance of expanded cohabitation during the past several decades. Oldham first
observed that "cohabitation continues to become more popular" in nations, includ
ing the United States, where little or no status recognition is extended to such rela
tionships?26 He then proceeded to ask, "[w]ould this trend be exacerbated with
more legal recognition?,,227 Oldham stated his ambivalent conclusion, as follows:
"It is hard to be certain whether recognizing cohabitation as a status would dis
courage marriage. ,,228
Finally, unlike Professors Estin and Oldham, Professor Lynn D. Wardle char
acterized the past few decades as a period when the legal system did extend sig
nificant recognition to unmarried cohabitants, under the contract theories described
229
earlier in this Article. Furthermore, he found a possible causal connection be
tween this state of the law and private decisions to cohabit, stating:

224 See id. at 13 81.
225Id. at 1408 (citation omitted). See generally Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Concubinage and
Its Alternatives: A Proposal For A More Peifect Union, 26 LoY. L. REV. 1,23 (1980) (making a
similar observation about the status of concubinage in Louisiana, which attached negative conse
quences to certain non-marital relationships, as follows: "Penalizing those who have chosen concu
binage over marriage has not significantly promoted the latter institution at the expense of the for
mer.").
226 Oldham, supra note 171, at 1425.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Wardle, supra note 148, at 1198. The development of contract-based theories to pro
vide remedies for unmarried cohabitants at the time of relationship dissolution is discussed supra
text accompanying notes 140-44.
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[Nlonmarital cohabitation increased dramatically after the famous

Marvin v. Marvin case and similar "palimony" cases in courts in
other states .... Between 1970 ... and 1999 ... the number of un
married heterosexual couples living together rose more than 800
percent. ... While cause and effect relations between legal changes
and social changes are hard to pin down exactly, at least it can be
230
reasonably said that there might be some causal connection.

Clearly, the experience of the past decades has resulted in no definitive guide to
predicting the impact of greater legal recognition of nonmarital cohabitation upon
marriage rates in the future.
If one assumes that private decisions about marriage are influenced, to some
extent, by the relevant rules oflaw, then the laws of marriage and cohabitation can
be evaluated for their likely impact on the reasonable individual or couple making
a marriage decision. 231 As a general rule, the reasonable person can be expected to
select the family status that provides the greatest benefits for him or her. Focusing
solely on the incentives to marry or not arising from the legal differences between
marriage and cohabitation, marriage will remain attractive if it affords greater
benefits to the individual or couple than any alternative status would offer. For ex
ample, within this frame of reference, the recent reduction of the marriage penalty
under the federal income tax law, described above,232 can be seen as removing a
practical disincentive for many couples making marriage decisions.
Generally speaking, a posture of complete nonrecognition of unmarried co
habitation provides a practical incentive to marry in order to obtain legal benefits.
Thus, many legal consequences of marriage involving third-party rights and obliga
tions, like the tort doctrine of the Elden case,233 confer benefits upon married cou
ples only.234 However, the incentives built into the current laws regulating marriage
supra note 148, at 1226-27 (citations omitted).
See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status of Their
Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 9-14 (2000) (describing marriage incentives and disincentives aris
ing under numerous laws regulating marriage).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 187-89 (discussing recent changes in federal income
tax law designed to reduce the marriage penalty for many couples).
233 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), discussed supra text accompanying notes
174-75, and infra text accompanying notes 267-70, 284-91. The dissenting justice in the Elden case
explicitly rejected the possibility of any impact of the relevant tort doctrines on marriage decisions,
as follows:
The majority contend that the state's interest in the institution of marriage is inhibited to
the extent unmarried persons are granted the same rights as married persons.... Pre
sumably, a person who would not otherwise choose to marry would not be persuaded to
do so in order to assure his or her legal standing in a future personal injury action
should that person have the misfortune of witnessing the serious injury of his or her
spouse.
Id. at 591 (Broussard, 1., dissenting). See also Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 955 (N.M. 2003)
(stating "[i]t is doubtful that anyone would choose to marry simply because they would not be al
lowed to bring a future loss of consortium claim otherwise," in opinion extending the cause of ac
tion for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants).
234 See PRINCIPLES OF TIlE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.02 cmt. b, at 916
230 Wardle,
231
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and cohabitation do not uniformly favor the marriage option. For example, a
widowed individual who receives federal Social Security benefits as the survivor
of his or her deceased spouse will automatically lose the benefits upon remarriage,
but not upon the formation of a cohabiting relationship.236 In a similar manner,
some state alimony laws provide for the automatic termination of alimony upon the
recipient's remarriage, but not upon a post-divorce cohabitation. 237 Ironically, this
economic disincentive to enter a second marriage exists here because the recipi
ent's second marriage would have legal significance within the benefits system,
while a cohabiting relationship would not. Predictably, the decision whether to
marry may be directly influenced in some cases by this type of rule, which attaches
an immediate and measurable financial burden to the marriage decision.
Furthennore, another set of rules provide, in the case of some couples, a
mixed incentive whereby marriage better serves the financial interests of one part
ner only. This is especially true of the doctrines establishing economic rights and
duties between married partners. If only one partner has extensive resources and
the prospect of a high income level in the future, the individual economic well
being of the propertied partner would not be well served by getting married. The
selfish financial interests of the propertied partner would be better served by main
taining a cohabiting relationship, which generally confers fewer claims to his or
her resources upon the other partner. At the same time, the rules of law create just
the opposite incentive for the non-propertied partner, who would benefit from the
property and support rights of marriage.
(noting that "informal domestic relationships are not generally recognized by third parties, including
governments, which often makes marriage advantageous under various regulatory and benetit
schemes").
235 For example, scholars Wendell E. Primus and Jennifer Beeson, of the federal Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, reported in 2002 on numerous studies about the benetits available for
poor families under the federal income tax laws, and the Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Medi
caid. Food Stamp, housing assistance, and child support enforcement programs. See Primus &
Beeson, supra note 179. The authors compared the tinancial provisions under these programs for
married couples with common children, and the corresponding provisions for cohabiting couples
with common children. Primus and Beeson concluded that, overall, there are few economic incen
tives to prefer one family format over the other. ld. at 225. Furthertnore, they concluded that most of
the rules reward two-parent households, whether or not the parents are married, as compared to
single-parent households. ld.
236 See 42 U.S.c. § 402(e)(1)(A) (2000). Notably, the Pennsylvania workers' compensation
benefit system does not follow the federal Social Security model in this regard. The state workers'
compensation law provides for the termination of survivor's benefits upon either remarriage or un
married cohabitation by the recipient. See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 562 (West 2003). The Pennsylvania
courts have defined the tertn "meretricious relationship" under the state statute to mean "[a relation
ship] in which the individuals are living together, without the benefit of marriage, in a carnal way."
Anthony v. Workers' Compo Appeal Bd., 823 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
237 See GREGORYET AL., supra note 133, § 9.05, at 309-12; Wendy Ricketts, The Relevance of
Premarital and Postmarital Cohabitation in Awarding Spousal Support, 7 DIVORCE LmG. 150 (July
1995) (collecting relevant state statutes and case law). See generally Diane M. Allen, Annotation,
Divorce or Separated Spouse's Living With Member of Opposite Sex As Affecting Other Spouse's
Obligation ofAlimony or Support Under Separation Agreement, 47 A.L.R. 4th 38 (1986) (discuss
ing the impact of cohabitation on support rights under separation agreements).
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This type of financial incentive clearly exists in the laws governing divorce. 238
The commentary accompanying the recent ALI proposal to establish economic
rights for cohabitants interse, which are equivalent to the rights of married part
ners at the time of relationship dissolution, addresses this precise issue. 239 The
commentary to Chapter 6 assesses the marriage incentive from the perspective of
the wealthier partner described in the above scenario, and predicts a positive mar
riage incentive:
[T]o the extent that some individuals avoid marriage in order to
avoid responsibilities to a partner, this Chapter reduces the incentive
to avoid marriage because it diminishes the effectiveness of that
strategy. Under this Chapter, one may avoid such obligations in
long-term nonmarital relationships only as one may avoid them in
marriage, by entering enforceable agreements so providing. 24o
The commentary does not, however, consider the matter from the perspective of
the partner with fewer economic resources.
In summary, the likely impact of status recognition for unmarried cohabitants
upon private marriage decisions and upon the institution of marriage is a highly
speculative matter.
Proponents of status recognition for opposite sex cohabitants have considered the
potential impact of reform. As described above, there is a wide range of opinion
about the likely impact of enhanced recognition upon marriage rates. 241 The poten
tial impact of reform upon the symbolic importance of marriage is more difficult to
predict, and would be more difficult to measure. Reformers favor status recogni
tion for unmarried cohabitants, however, even if the recognition of an alternative
status in the law for opposite sex couples would cause marriage to "lose some ofits
luster.,,242
238 See Wardle, supra note 148, at 1210 (citatbn omitted) ("Fear of the economic conse
quences of failure of a marriage is a major reason for people cohabiting as domestic partners rather
than entering marriage.").
Ironically, it appears that the unavailability of divorce may also have a negative impact on
marriage decisions. A recent newspaper article described the impact of the law in the nation of
Chile, which does not allow full divorce, on marriage decisions:
[P]roponents [of anew divorce law] say the absence of divorce has ... produced severe
social distortions. The number of marriages recorded has sharply dropped ... , and
nearly half of all children here are now born to unmarried couples. "With no divorce,
people don't want to get married," said ... [the] director of the Center for Women's
Studies.
Larry Rohter, Chile inches Toward a Law That Would Make Divorce Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,

atA4.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.02 cmt. b, at
915-16.
240 [d. at 916.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 224-30 (describing the opinions ofvanous scholars on

2003,

239

this matter).
242 Chambers, supra note 151, at 1357. After acknowledging the point made in the text aboma
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Thus, according to Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr., "[t]he state's desire to cre
ate incentives or express social values [relating to marriage] may be outweighed by
more important considerations.,,243 The competing considerations identified in
Regan's analysis involve the harms associated with the nonrecognition of estab
lished families. Regan's recent proposal for a new status for unmarried cohabitants
involves a bundle of rights less weighty than those associated with marriage, yet
244
adequate to ameliorate certain harms associated with nonrecognition. His pro
posal involves law reform that would, inter alia, protect the financially vulnerable
partner in a domestic relationship, allow partners to care for each other, and assure
24S
that children are not harmed by virtue of the unmarried status of their parents.
The author believes that the value of these benefits for the members of families
headed by unmarried cohabitants outweighs the value of preserving marriage as the
exclusive legal status for opposite sex couples.
Clearly, the goals of encouraging marriage decisions and preserving a central
place for marriage in the law, discussed in this Subsection, play an important role
in the formulation of modern family law doctrines. The potential impact of greater
legal recognition for unmarried cohabitation upon the institution of marriage is
likely to remain a major consideration in discourse about the future of family law.

D. Policy Considerations Relating to the Balance Between
Certainty and Fairness in the Law
Proposals to establish unmarried cohabitation as an alternative legal status for
opposite sex couples raise concerns about a resulting decrease in the level of cer
tainty about family status relationships. Apart from formal registration systems, the
recognition of an informal family status would likely generate some confusion
about which unmarried couples actually belong in the category of legally recog
nized cohabitants. The traditional rules oflaw, which generally deny status recog
nition to unregistered cohabitants, avoid this issue altogether. Proposals for change
in the field of cohabitants' rights must consider how to distinguish between eligible
and ineligible couples, and the costs involved in drawing such a line.
A tension exists throughout the family law system between the goals associ
ated with certainty and predictability, on the one hand, and the competing goal of
fairness, which frequently demands flexibility in the formulation and application of

feared negative impact on marriage, Professor Chambers suggested that the introduction of his pro
posed "designated friends" status might have just the opposite effect. He stated: "If anything, per
mitting couples to register for a status that carries very few benefits would seem likely to enhance
the status of marriage as the most prized of relationships." !d. at 1361.
243 Regan, supra note 169, at 1438.
244!d. See also Oldham, supra note 171, at 1427-28 (citation omitted) ("One compromise pol
icy approach ... would be to consider cohabitation as a status if certain specified attributes would
be satisfied. but this status would entail fewer rights and obligations than marriage.... [B]ecause
this approach treats cohabitants differently from spouses, it presumably would be less likely to dis
courage marriage.").
245 Regan, supra note 169. at 1449-50.
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particular rules. In the formulation of U.S. family law doctrines, no uniform ap
proach has been taken to balancing these competing interests. Thus, for example,
the balance leans toward fairness and the exercise of discretion in certain laws,
such as the best interests of the child standard employed to resolve custody dis
putes between divorcing parents. 247 In other key areas of family law, however, such
as the calculation of child support awards pursuant to quantitative guidelines, the
balance favors certainty over flexibility?48
The current rules defining important family status relationships generally fall
into the category of laws that emphasize certainty over fairness. The laws govern
ing the marriage status illustrate this point. The study of this aspect of marriage law
is helpful in assessing proposals to recognize cohabitation as a legal status.
As a general rule, a couple can get married only by complying with state
mandated formalities, which require a marriage license and a marriage cere
mony.249 These formalities assure that the existence of a marriage is a relatively
easy matter to prove. Against this backdrop, the doctrine of cornmon law marriage,
recognized today in approximately a dozen U.S. jurisdictions, permits entry into
25o
marriage in the absence of the prescribed licensing and ceremonial formalities.
The cornmon law marriage doctrine recognizes de facto marriage relationships
in a manner that is fair to couples who, for whatever reasons, failed to comply with
the formalities when they entered into marriage. As to these couples, who agreed to
be married and subsequently lived a married life together,25I the doctrine extends
the benefits and protections of the legal marriage status. In the absence of such
recognition, hardship could result, especially for the financially dependent partner
in a nonformalized union.
The recognition of informal unions under the cornmon law marriage doctrine
is achieved, however, at the expense of clarity and predictability. No one can be
certain about a couple's marital status under the common law marriage doctrine
until a judicial determination is made, based on evidence describing the nature of
their relationship. The resulting uncertainty creates costs for the courts, for couples

246 See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P. 3d 948. 955 (N.M. 2003) (stating that "[e]ase of administra
tion ... does not necessarily further the interests of justice," in opinion extending the tort cause of
action for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants); James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a United
Field Theory ofthe Family: The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu
tion, 2001 BYU L. REV. 923, 925-27 (describing the ALI's approach to this issue); Mary Ann
Glendon. Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law. 60 TuL. L.
REV. 1165 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and Reflection. 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
247 See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA' s Best
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991).
248 See LAURA MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATIOK §§
1.02-.03 (Supp. 2003).
249 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133, § 2.04.
250ld. § 2.05[A].
251 Generally speaking, the standard for establishing a common law marriage requires proof
that the couple agreed to be married, otten coupled with evidence that they lived together and held
themselves out to the corrununity as spouses. Id. § 2.05lAJ, at 37; Caudill, supra note 4, at 560-62.
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in infonnal partnerships, and for the third parties who deal with such couples in
both private and commercial settings. 252
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania emphasized the interests ofthird
parties in this context, when the court rejected the common law marriage doctrine
in the recent case of PNC Bank Corporation v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board,253 as follows:
[U]ncertainty as to marital status has a far greater detrimental im
pact on third parties today than when the [common law marriage]
doctrine was created.... In twenty-first century commerce, third
parties need and are entitled to know whether the men, women and
couples with whom they contract are married or single, for that may
significantly affect their rights. Statutory marriage provides a certain
record if third parties choose to investigate; common law marriage
may be impossible to ascertain or verify until some dispute brings
about court proceedings. 254
The PNC Bank case involved the claim by a man for benefits from the state work
ers' compensation board, as the surviving common law spouse of a deceased
worker. The court pointed out that the claimant's status in such a case could only
be established through litigation, which imposed costs on the employer and the
compensation board, as well as the claimant and the courtS. 255
252 Ironically, during the nineteenth century debate about first introducing formal requirements
into the law of marriage, the argument was made that certainty about marriage status was best
achieved by retaining an expansive common law marriage doctrine. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GoVERNING THE HEARTH 92 (1985) ("Certainty was the goal of all those involved in the marriage
question, indeed of the law itself. Most judges and lawyers held up the common law as the best de
vice for securing certainty, but reformers ... demanded codification."). In the modern context,
where the formal requirements are well-established and well-known. the goal ofcertainty is associ
ated with abolishing the common law doctrine, in the manner discussed in the text.
253pNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Camp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
The decision of the Commonwealth Court created some confusion about the status of the common
law marriage doctrine in Pennsylvania. See Robert E. Rains, Adding Uncertainty to Uncertainty
About Common Law Marriage, 25 PA, FAM. LAWYER 101 (2003). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court is one of two intermediate appellate courts; its appellate jurisdiction is limited to lawsuits
involving the state government. See LISA STEFANONI, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE HANDBOOK:
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 2.5 (2004). Thus, the PNC Bank decision prospectively abolishing
the common law marriage doctrine had no precedential value in cases involving two private parties.
Indeed, the state Superior Court, which has intermediate appellate jurisdiction in such cases, subse
quently reviewed a common law marriage claim, declining to follow the Commonwealth Court's
ruling in the PNC Bank case. See Bell v. Ferraro, 849 A.2d. 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). The Penn
sylvania legislature acted in December of 2004, abolishing the common law marriage doctrine in
Pennsylvania as to marriages contracted after January I, 2005. See H.B. 2719, 188th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004).
254 PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1281.
255 The PNC Bank court affirmed a determination that the claimant was entitled to workers'
compensation benefits as the decedent's surviving common law spouse. The decision to set aside the
common law marriage doctrine was intended by the Commonwealth Court to apply prospectively.
See id. at 1272.
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Although common law marriage was once a prevalent state law doctrine in the
256
United States, today only a small minority of jurisdictions retain the doctrine.
The gradual erosion of the doctrine has been premised in large part on the public
interest in certainty and predictability in the laws identifying family relation
ships.257 Thus, for example, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in the PNC
Bank case stated that "imposing the rights and obligations attendant to marriage
only upon those who have entered into their unions pursuant to ... statutory pro
cedures ... provides a bright line standard to guide ... the public in conducting
and defining their relationships with some measure of certainty and stability. ,,258 In
the large majority of U.S. jurisdictions today, the only way to create a legal mar
riage status is by satisfying the formal requirements established by state law.
Modem debates about the recognition of a new legal status for unmarried co
habitants inevitably tread over much of the same ground as the historical and mod
em debates about common law marriage. Cne common discussion point is a con
cern that the legal system will compromise the goal of certainty regarding family
status if nonformalized unions between women and men are recognized in the law.
Proponents of a new legal status for unmarried cohabitants have addressed the
issue of identifying qualified couples in various ways. One model requires the pub
lic registration of a document, an analogue to the marriage license, by couples de
siring to enter the legal status of unmarried cohabitation. 259 This registration model,
like the state doctrines that limit marriage recognition to formally licensed unions,
protects the interests associated with certainty and predictability in the family law
system. On the other hand, a registration system is not flexible enough to recognize
unregistered, de facto relationships for which legal recognition might be the fair
result, in light of the purposes of the substantive doctrines creating the new family
status of unmarried cohabitation,z6o Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr. has summarized
256 See Bowman, supra note 204, at 715 ("Common law marriage is now recognized in only
eleven states and the District of Columbia, down from a majority of the states in 1920 and even
more in the nineteenth century."); GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133, § 2.05 [A], at 37 n.99.
257 The other justifications for repeal of the common law marriage doctrine have shifted in
relative importance during the lengthy period, from the late nineteenth century to the present, when
the issue has been debated. They include protection of the institution of marriage, concern about
fraudulent claims. disapproval of informal interracial marriages at a time when participation in an
interracial marriage ceremony was a crime, and more modem concerns about maintaining vital sta
tistics. Bowman, supra note 204, at 750-52. According to Bowman, "[t]he ... group of arguments
for the abolition of common law marriage ... based upon administrative and judicial efficiency ...
are undoubtedly the strongest." [d. at 752. Notably, Bowman concluded that the benefits of protect
ing dependent family members under the common law marriage doctrine outweigh the costs im
posed by its recognition, as follows: "I conclude ... that the common law marriage doctrine should
be revived because it protects the interests of women. especially poor women and women of color,
more effectively than any of the theories suggested to address the problems created by its absence."
[d. at 779.
258 PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1280.
259 See, e.g.. Chambers, supra note 151 (proposing a legal status for pairs of "designated
friends" who comply with a registration procedure).
260 But see Reppy, supra note 4, at 1678, 1718-19 (proposing a legal status for unmarried co
habitants, which could be created either by registration or pursuant to "a doctrine which can be
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the resulting dilemma, as follows: "If domestic partners must register in order to
enjoy any rights or obligations, many deserving individuals will be left without
recourse. If some claims will be recognized even in the absence of registration,
then a registration scheme will provide little ... predictability ....,,261
The registration model has been implemented in the domestic partnership leg
islation enacted in recent years in numerous u.S. jurisdictions.262 The existing do
mestic partnership laws generally establish substantive standards relating to the
nature of the couple's relationship, which operate as a threshold standard of eligi
bility.263 The eligibility criteria tend to focus on marriage-like qualities of the cou
pIe's relationship, such as cohabitation, shared financial responsibility, the absence
of a relationship that would prevent the couple from marrying, and a close personal
bond between them. 264 As a general rule, the partners make their own determina
tion of eligibility, which is not reviewed by the state. Upon completing the formal
registration process, the couple's relationship is recognized as a domestic partner
ship, and they become entitled to the benefits provided by the domestic partnership
law.
The standard of marriage-like behavior, which appears in the eligibility crite
ria of the domestic partnership laws, is also the hallmark of the second approach to
creating a legal status for unmarried cohabitants. The alternative model allows cou
ples to create a legal status simply by engaging in certain conduct, without reliance
on a formal registration system. Notably, the standard of marriage-like behavior
has typically served in this manner as the eligibility standard in other doctrines,
such as common law marriage, that recognize nonformalized cohabiting relation
ships.265 By way of contrast, in the case of a formally married couple, legal status
called common law cohabitation").
261 Regan, supra note 169, at 1462-63.
262 See Duncan, supra note ISO, at 963-64, 968-69 (noting that all three of the state domestic
partnership laws and all but one of the thirty-five municipal ordinances studied by the author in
cluded a registration requirement). Other aspects of domestic partnership laws are discussed supra
notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
263 See Duncan, supra note ISO, at 969-74.
264 See id. (collecting and cataloguing all of the eligibility requirements contained in the do
mestic partnership laws studied by the author).
265 See Ariela DubIer, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 957 (2000) (discussing the importance of marriage-like behavior in identifying legally signifi
cant, informal relationships under both the common law marriage doctrine and modem laws defin
ing rights for unmarried cohabitants); Blumberg, supra note 133, at 1297 (noting that Chapter 6 of
the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution "sought to formulate rules that would distin
guish relationships that are marriage-like from those that are not"); Estin, supra note 176, at 1391
(noting that state laws providing broad remedies at the time of relationship dissolution generally
"require ... that ... cohabitation be 'marriage-like'" in order to qualify for relief beyond traditional
contract remedies). See generally Note, Looking For a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the
FunctionalApproach To the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1640. 1654-55 (1991)
(criticizing the "functional approach" to defining the status of unmarried cohabitation, because a
"marriage-like" standard is employed).
The Canadian legal system has also relied upon the standard of marriage-like behavior to iden
tify legally significant nonformalized relationships. The standard was criticized in a recent law jour
nal article, as follows:

[20051

FORCES SHAPING THE LAW OF COHABITATION

187

consequences automatically attach when the formal marriage requirements of li
cense and ceremony have been met, without any inquiry into the nature or quality
of the parties' relationship?66
The dissenting opinion in the California Supreme Court case of Elden v. Shel
don,267 discussed earlier, illustrates this conduct-based approach to identifying le
gally significant unmarried cohabiting relationships. The dissenting justice in El
den proposed a general standard of "stability and significance" of the cohabiting
relationship, for identifying unmarried partners who would be eligible to initiate
certain lawsuits. 268 Thus, the person who met this standard would have standing to
sue for damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of con
sortium resulting from a tortious injury to his or her unmarried partner. Further
more, according to the dissenting opinion in Elden, "evidence of the stability and
significance of a relationship can be demonstrated by reference to several objective
factors, including 'the duration of the relationship; whether the parties have a mu
tual contract; the degree of economic cooperation and entanglement; exclusivity of
sexual relations; [and] whether there is a family relationship with children ....",269
According to this opinion, the recognition of tort claims in these circumstances
would allow compensation for the partners of injured victims in a fair and just
manner, consistent with the underlying purposes of the relevant tort doctrines.
However, the California Supreme Court in Elden refused to establish such a
standard, or to recognize relational tort claims by cohabitants under any circum
stances. According to the majority opinion, "the allowance of a cause of action ...
would impose a difficult burden on the courts. It would require a court to inquire
into the relationship of the partners,,,270 an inquiry not required to establish stand
ing in tort cases involving spouses. Furthermore, the standard proposed by the dis
sent, involving the search for marriage-like qualities in each cohabiting relation
ship, "would not provide a sufficiently definite and predictable test to allow for
consistent application from case to case.,,271 Thus, the California Supreme Court
Ironically, at the same time as lawmakers have abandoned the view that marriage should
be the only state-sanctioned adult intimate relationship, they have extended the use of
marriage or marriage-like relationships to accomplish a range of state policies.
. . . Conjugality or marriage-equivalence is a poor proxy for the relational attributes
relevant to legislative objectives.
Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What Is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality, 18
CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 274 (2001).
266 See Regan, supra note 169, at 1447-48.
267 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
268 Id. at 590 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
269 ld. at 593 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting Butcher v. Superior Court. 188 Cal. Rptr.
503,512 (1983)). See also Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994) (establishing the fol
lowing relationship standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress cases: "an intimate famil
ial relationship that is stable, enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive"); Blumberg, supra
note 1, at 1131 (cataloguing "elements [to] be used to define unmarried cohabitation" as a legally
significant status. and noting that "[mlost of these elements may be subsumed in the term of 'eco
nomic and social integration"').
270 Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
2711d. See also Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 383 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the end, only the two
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emphasized the costs associated with legal recognition of nonformalized relation
ships, in closing the door to tort claims by unmarried cohabitants.
Recently, the ALl established an eligibility standard in Chapter 6 ofthePrin
ciples ofthe Law ofFamily Dissolution, in its proposal to extend economic rights
to eligible domestic partners at the time of relationship dissolution. Eligible domes
tic partners are defined there as "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not mar
ried to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary residence
and a life together .... ,,272 In fleshing out this general standard, the Principles util
ize both a multi-factor standard, like the standard proposed by the dissenting opin
ion in Elden, and two affinnative presumptions. Professor Lynn D. Wardle sum
marized the resulting scheme for identifying legally significant domestic partner
ships under the ALI proposal, as follows:
Couples are irrebuttably presumed to be domestic partners
"when they have maintained a common household ... with their
.
common child" for' a minimum continuous ... period of time
Couples are rebuttably presumed to be domestic partners if they .
have maintained a common household for a minimum continuous
period of time .... If neither presumption applies, a party may still
establish domestic partnership by proving "that for a significant pe
riod of time the parties shared a primary residence and a life to
gether as a couple." This determination must be made in light of
thirteen categorical considerations ... , including oral statements,
commingled finances, economic dependency, specialized roles,
changes in the parties' lives, naming beneficiaries, distinctive rela
tions, emotional and sexual intimacy, community reputation, com
mitment or attempted marriage ceremony, joint procreation, child
rearing or adoption, and common household. 273
The use of time-based presumptions in the manner proposed by the ALI
would make the finding of domestic partnership status a more certain matter, in
those cases where the presumptions apply. As to couples who fall outside the scope
of the two affirmative presumptions, status detennination would require the appli
cation of multiple factors regarding relationship quality to the facts of each case. 274

people involved in the relationship really know how close and stable their relationship is."); Harry
D. Krause. Marriage For the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex-Or Not At All?, 34 FAM.
L.Q. 271, 297 (2000) ("[U]nless a legal formality 'sanctifies' the partnership, the expense and un
certainty of litigation ex post facto to determine whether a status actually existed ... may well not be
worth the unpredictability and trouble it would cause in human relations.").
272 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.03(1).
273Wardle. supra note 148, at 1196 (quoting in places from § 6.03 of the Principles).
274Compare Blumberg, supra note 133. at 1298-99 (opining that all but the "rare" and ;'infre
quent" case would be resolved by reliance on the ALI presumptions) and Westfall, supra note 143,
at 1479 ("[The ALI proposal] would inject a troubling degree of uncertainty into the determination
of when domestic partnership status exists.").
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The use of durational thresholds for eligibility, a feature of the presumptions
established in the ALI proposal, is a common element in other proposals to recog
nize informal cohabitation as a legal status. 275 In most cases, the factual determina
tion about how long a couple lived together is a straightforward matter,276 and the
durational threshold becomes an objective test for excluding short term relation
ships from legal recognition. The ALI proposal leaves to each enacting state the
formulation of a specific minimum "continuous period of time" that will give rise
277
to a presumption of domestic partnership status. The illustrative examples in the
ALI commentary use a hypothetical minimum period of two years for couples liv
ing together with a common child or children, and a hypothetical minimum period
278
of three years for couples living together without a common child. Notably, a
three-year threshold would remove the large majority of cohabiting relationships
from the operation of the presumptioh, as most cohabitants marry or break up
279
within this time period. Of course, the ALI proposal would permit the partner in
a shorter-term relationship to make a claim to domestic partnership status, but
without the benefit of a presumption.
An additional aspect of the uncertainty associated with the recognition of non
formalized relationships is the question of status termination. Once an unmarried
couple establishes a legally significant relationship, based on their conduct, how do
the two partners and interested third parties know when the status has been termi
nated in the eyes of the law? In the case of formal marriage, the entry of a divorce
decree provides a record of the termination. Similarly, most domestic partnership
registration models employ a formal procedure for documenting the termination of
a partnership as a matter of public record. 280 In the case of the nonformalized co
habitation status, termination would likely be established in an informal manner,
by conduct revealing the couple's intent to end their relationship.
275 See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255, 316-25 (2002) (establishing "a
minimum cohabiting partnership duration-three years-before the surviving committed partner
may take any portion of the decedent's intestate estate," under the author's proposal for inheritance
by domestic partners); Blumberg, supra note I, at 1140-44 (proposing a two-year durational re
quirement for cohabitation status); Caudill, supra note 4, at 567 (proposing "[a]n easily met test,
such as two years of continual cohabitation, minimal evidence of economic interdependence, and
reputation or conduct showing a stable family unit," as the basis for a presumption of "constructive
marital status").
276 But cf GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133, § 8.03 (discussing constructional problems arising
under divorce laws that establish a durational period of "living separate and apart" as a ground for
divorce).
277 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.03 cmt. d, at 920-21.
278 !d.
279 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 204, at 56 ("For most couples, cohabitations are relatively
brief, with the majority ending them either by terminating the relationship or by marrying within a
few years. Recent estimates from the United States suggest that only about one sixth of couples re
main cohabiting for 3 years ....").
280 See Duncan, supra note 150, at 975 (citations omitted) ("The most common provision in
domestic partnership statutes provides for termination upon the death of one of the parties or by a
statement or affidavit filed with the clerk.").
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Thus, for example, Chapter 6 of the ALI Principles ofthe Law ofFamily Dis
solution provides that ''It]he domestic-partnership period ends when the panies
ceased sharing a primary residence.,,281 This type of conduct-based factual deter
mination would be easily made in most cases arising under the Principles, which
only involve the couple's financial claims inter se. Accurate and timely determina
tions about when a couple ceased living together would predictably become more
difficult under a legal regime that assigned more extensive rights and obligations,
involving third parties and the government, to the cohabitation status. Third parties
interested in a couple's status would not necessarily have easy access to infonna
tion about when the partners ceased living together.
The legal recognition of nonformalized cohabiting relationships would inevi
tably add a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability about family status, for co
habiting couples and the third parties who have an interest in their relationships.
Proponents of legal recognition believe that the costs associated with these ele
ments of uncertainty about legal family status would be outweighed by the benefits
of recognition. 282 The benefits, of course, involve the fairness to family members
and the stabilization of de facto families, which would follow from the assignment
of specified rights and duties to eligible cohabiting couples. To date, the courts and
legislatures have not, for the most part, balanced these competing considerations in
favor of status recognition for opposite sex, cohabiting couples.

E. Policy Considerations Arising Under Non-Family Law Doctrines
The question of legal recognition for unmarried cohabitants often arises when
the courts are asked to extend a particular legal consequence associated with mar
283
riage to unmarried couples. For example, in the case of Elden v. Sheldon, dis
cussed earlier,284 the California Supreme Court was asked to recognize the plain
tiff's claims for loss of consortium and the negligent infliction of emotional dis
tress against a defendant whose alleged negligence had caused the death of plain
tiff's unmarried partner. In denying standing to the plaintiff, the California Su
preme Court relied upon various public policies described in the preceding Subsec
tions, including the state's interest in promoting marriage and the state's preference
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.04(2)(b).
e.g., Spitko, supra note 275, at 286-87 ("It is a principal challenge for succession law .
. . to balance a concern with certainty and ease of administration with the desire for succession law
to better serve the needs of property owners who have formed less dominant family structures.").
See generally MAHONEY, supra note 170, at I I ("The challenge for the legal system is to formulate
laws that fairly reflect and define the interests of family members [within the stepfamily Jwithout
creating undue confusion or uncertainty.").
283 Domestic partnership legislation constitutes a major exception to the observation made in
the text that decisions about status recognition for unmarried cohabitants are typically made on an
issue-by-issue basis. For example, the Vermont civil union statute extends all of the benefits and
obligations of marriage under state law to the partners in a civil union. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1201 (2000).
"84 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), discussed supra text accompanying notes
174-75; 267-71.
281 PRINCIPLES

282 See,
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for easily administered rules. In addition, the Elden court relied upon certain public
policies relating to the particular tort doctrines invoked by the plaintiff. This type
of reference to non-family law policies occurs in many cases involving the rights of
unmarried cohabitants within a particular doctrinal field.
The plaintiff in the Elden case, Richard Elden, had been a passenger in the car
driven by his partner, Linda Eberling, when another driver caused the traffic acci
dent in which Elden sustained injuries and Eberling died. Elden sought to recover
damages against the other driver, based on his partner's death, under two related
theories. First, Elden sought compensation under the tort theory of negligent inflic
tion of emotional distress, for the mental distress he suffered from witnessing Eber
285
ling's traumatic death. And second, Elden sought compensation for the loss of
his relationship to the decedent, i.e., for loss of consortium. 286 Both the negligent
infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium causes of action were well
established theories of recovery in California, for losses based on the injury or
death of a claimant's spouse. In refusing to extend these relational tort doctrines to
cases involving unmarried cohabitants, the California Supreme Court relied upon a
basic policy consideration that underpins the common law system oftort liability.
Namely, the person whose negligent conduct harms others should be liable to the
287
victims, but the scope of liability should be limited in a reasonable fashion. Ap
plying this principle in Elden, the California Supreme Court concluded that ex
tending the established relational tort doctrines beyond formalized family relation
ships "would result in the unreasonable extension of the scope of liability of a neg
ligent actor.,,288
The dissenting opinion in Elden cited this same basic principle regarding the
scope of tort liability, in concluding that the state should recognize Richard El
den's claims, as follows:
An approach that grants recovery to those plaintiffs foreseeably and
genuinely injured by a negligent defendant's acts both advances the
goals of tort compensation and sufficiently limits liability. To that
end, a standard based on the significance and stability of the plain
tiff's relationship is workable and fair. 289

285 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 302, 308-12 (2001) (providing back
ground information about the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress); John G. Culhane, A
"Clanging Silence": Same Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 Ky. LJ. 911, 943-46 (2000-2001) (same);
Laura M. Raisty, Note, Bystander Distress and Loss of Consortium: An Examination of the Rela
tionship Requirements In Light of Romer v. Evans, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2647, 2652-58 (1997)
(same).
286 See generally Culhane, supra note 285, at 949-53 (discussing loss of consortium doctrine);
Raisty, supra note 285, at 2649-52 (same).
287 See Culhane, supra note 285, at 943, 950.
288 Elden, 758 P.2d at 588.
289 Id. at 593 (Broussard, 1., dissenting). See also Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 379 (N.J.
1994) ("[W]e have no sense that the application of bystander liability to an engaged cohabitant con
stitutes an avu1sive expansion of ton liability.").
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Notably, the majority and dissenting opinions in Elden both relied upon the same
underlying tort-related policy, as well as the family-related policies described ear
lier,290 in support of their opposite conclusions about recognizing unmarried co
habitants' claims?91
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Elden represents the majority
rule among state courts that have addressed the issue of cohabitant standing to
claim damages for loss of consortium and the negligent infliction of emotional dis
tress. 292 There are, however, a few exceptions to the general rule limiting the scope
of tort liability in this fashion. 293 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Dunphy v. Grego/ 94 recognized the claim of a surviving cohabitant, who had wit
nessed the death of her partner in an auto accident, for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In doing so, the New Jersey court expressly rejected the holding
of the California court in Elden. 295 The Dunphy court began by describing the pre
Elden expansion of tort liability under the emotional distress doctrine in California,
and the concern of the California Supreme Court in Elden about adding to the eco
nomic burden already imposed on tort defendants?96 Next, the Dunphy court ob
290See supra text accompanying notes 267-71 (describing discussions about the importance of
certainty in the laws regulating family relationships, in both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Elden).
291 Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr. summarized the difficulty of balancing all ofthe competing
policies in this context, as follows: 'The arguments on each side of this issue [whether to extend
relational tort doctrines to include unmarried cohabitants] are strong ones, which makes its resolu
tion especially difficult." Regan, supra note 169, at 1461. Regan suggested that the analytical stale
mate might be resolved in the following manner: "One way to give some weight to each may be to
preserve a loss of consortium claim for spouses, but to permit an unmarried partner who witnessed
injury to his or her companion to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress." [d.
292 See Culhane, supra note 285, at 946-48; Sonja A Soehnel, Annotation, Action For Loss of
Consortium Based on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 40 AL.R. 4th 553 (1995). Funhermore, unmar
ried cohabitants are uniformly excluded from recovery under state wrongful death statutes, which
enable the survivors of a deceased tort victim to recover damages for the decedent's own direct
losses. See Culhane, supra note 285, at 953-60. The statutes typically provide a list of eligible
claimants who are the close relatives of the deceased victim, and these lists do notincIude surviving
unmarried partners. Id. at 955-60. In Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 732 P.2d 1021. 1024 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987), the Washington court refused to construe the term "wife" in the state wrongful death
statute to include the unmarried plaintiff who had a marriage-like relationship with the decedent.
293 See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (allowing cause of action for the negli
gent infliction of emotional distress); Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948 (N.M. 2003) (allowing cause
of action for loss of consortium); CAL. Cw. CODE § 1714.01 (Deering 2002) ("Domestic partners
shall be entitled to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress to the same extent
that spouses are entitled to do so under California law."), discussed in Michael Jay Gorback, Negli
gent Infliction ofEmotional Distress: Has the Legislative Response to Diane Whipple's Death Ren
dered the Hard-Line Stance of Elden and Thing Obsolete? 54 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 275-77 (2002).
State statutes such as the Vermont civil union law, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2001), which
extend the full complement of state law marital rights to unmarried cohabitants, allow recovery un
der the tort theories discussed in the text.
294 Dunphy, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
295 Dunphy is the only state high coun case to date recognizing the cause of action for negli
gent infliction of emotional distress for unmarried cohabitants.
296 Dunphy, 642 A2d at 374-75.
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served that the general development of emotional distress doctrine in New Jersey
had taken a much more restric6ve path. As a result, its extension to unmarried co
habitants in serious, stable relationships would, in the opinion of the court, be con
sistent with the general state policy limiting the tort liability of negligent actors in a
297
reasonable fashion.
The majority rule disallowing unmarried cohabitants' claims in the field of
tort law illustrates the more general resistance to cohabitants who seek recognition
for a specific purpose within the legal system. A significant exception appears,
however, in the laws regulating domestic violence, where the relationship of un
married cohabitation finds widespread recognition?98 The primary explanation for
this deviation from the norm of nonrecognition involves the nature and strength of
the underlying policy goals unique to the subject of domestic violence. Issues of
personal safety, and ultimately survival, in one's home are most compelling. In the
words of one commentator, "the straightforward policy consideration underlying
domestic violence statutes is the prohibition of violence that occurs within all
[types of] adult relationships.,,299 In the field of domestic violence law, public poli
cies specific to the subject matter have strongly influenced the treatment ofunmar
ried cohabitants.
Generally speaking, unmarried partners are included in criminal domestic vio
lence statutes,300 as well as the state laws providing civil remedies for violence,
including protection from abuse orders. 301 Many of these laws were enacted in the
1970s and 80s, in response to focused efforts by women's advocates to address the
subject of violence. During this period, the "battered women's movement" de
297

ld. at 375.

298 Professors

Clare Dalton and Elizabeth M. Schneider reviewed early statutes in the field of
domestic violence, and reached the following conclusion about their coverage of unmarried cohabi
tants:
Early [protective order] statutes were often quite limited [in defining the persons pro
tected]. They saw the problem of "domestic" violence as essentially a problem of "mari
tal," "family" or "household" violence, and some even limited relief to presently mar
ried partners .... Failure to extend relief to cohabiting partners may have rested on the
assumption that victims of abuse who were not tied to their abusers by marriage would
be free to set limits without the additional assistance of a restraining order, even if they
were sharing a household.
CLARE DALTON & EUZABETHM. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 502 (200l).
299 Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Iustice: Equal Protection For Victims of Same Sex Domestic
Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 370 (1995).
300 See Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, "Cohabitation" For Purposes ofDomestic Violence
Statutes, 71 A.L.R. 5th 285, 285 (1999) ("One aspect of domestic violence statutes is that a person
can be found guilty of the charged offense only if he or she was cohabiting with the person against
whom the violence was directed."). Ironically, unmarried cohabitants have also been included in
state criminal laws extending lesser protection to victims of rape if they happened to be married to
their abusers. Twenty-five years ago, laws that completely exempted spouses from prosecution for
rape were the nonn, see GREGORY ET AL.. supra note 133, § 7.08[CJ, and unmarried cohabitants
were often included, along with spouses. See Blumberg, supra note I, at 1139 n.84 (collecting thir
teen state statutes in 1981 that included unmarried cohabitants within the marital rape exemption).
301 See Catherine Klein & Les1ye Orloff, Providing Legal Protection For Battered Women: An
Analysis ofState Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRAL. REv. 801, 829 (1993).

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

194

Vol. 7 No. I

scribed the issue of domestic violence as a gender issue, rather than an exclusively
family-related issue. According to Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider:
The battered women's movement defined battering within the larger
framework of gender subordination. Domestic violence was linked
to women's inferior position within the family, discrimination within
the workplace, wage inequity, lack of educational opportunities, the
absence of social supports for mothering, and the lack of child
care. 302
Thus, the issue highlighted by women's advocates and addressed by the state legis
latures was defined by the plight of women who were unsafe in their homes, not by
formal family status.
At the same time, the primary family-related policy that supports the nonrec
ognition of unmarried cohabitants in so many other legal contexts has questionable
application here. The state's interest in favoring and promoting the institution of
marriage would hardly be advanced by restricting domestic violence laws to mar
ried adult partners. First, the phenomenon of violence is not a positive aspect of
family relationships. Thus, an inclusive definition of family for this purpose does
not interfere with the goal of creating a special and positive image for marriage in
the law?03 And second, it is unlikely that the additional goal of encouraging mar
riage decisions by eligible couples is hampered to any significant degree by includ
ing domestic partners in the domestic violence laws. 304 That is, couples are
unlikely to choose one relationship over the other based on the coverage of appli
cable domestic violence statutes.
Furthermore, the public policy favoring certainty and predictability about fam
ily status relationships is not a controlling consideration in the field of domestic
violence. The domestic violence laws clearly create an element of uncertainty
about their coverage, by including nonfonnalized families within the category of
regulated families. As in other legal contexts, the relationships of spouses or for
mer spouses are easily identified in most cases arising under the domestic violence
laws. By way of contrast, the determination whether a particular couple qualifies as
"unmarried cohabitants" covered by the domestic violence laws may require a fac
tual inquiry into the nature of their relationship. Lawmakers and law enforcers
have accepted the added burdens resulting from such ambiguity, in light of the
compelling purposes of the domestic violence laws.3°5
M. SCHNEIDER, BATIERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 23 (2000).
See supra text accompanying notes 204-09 (describing the goal of preserving a positive

302 ELIZABETH
303

message about marriage in the law, as a consideration in formulating laws to regulate unmarried
cohabitation).
304 See supra text accompanying notes 210-40 (discussing the behavior-shaping considerations
involved in formulating laws to regulate unmarried cohabitation).
305 In a similar manner, policy considerations about privacy and autonomy for the family and
its members, which are discussed later in Subsection G, lose their force in the domestic violence
context. Indeed, concerns about personal and family privacy arise for both married and unmarried
couples, when the state enforces domestic violence laws. Generally speaking, the state's interest in
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Furthermore, the courts have generally construed the term "cohabitant" or
"household member" broadly, in order to achieve these purposes. For example, in
Rickman v. Virginia,306 the Virginia appellate court ruled that the state's criminal
"assault and battery against a family or household member" statute must be con
strued broadly "to achieve the obvious intent of the legislature .... ,,307 Consistent
with this rule of construction, the court in Rickman concluded that parties who
lived together on a "part-time basis" were family or household members covered
308
by the state domestic violence law. Thus, the norm in the field of domestic vio
lence involves the recognition of unmarried cohabitation, broadly defined, based
309
on the underlying purposes of the governing civil and criminal statutes.
In a recent law review article, Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr. incorporated the
policy considerations of specific doctrinal fields, such as torts and domestic vio
lence, into an analytical matrix for formulating a new legal status for unmarried
cohabitants. 31O Regan used this matrix to evaluate the laws assigning rights and
obligations to married couples in various doctrinal fields, to determine which laws
could be beneficially extended to unmarried cohabitants. 311 In addition to the sub
ject-matter-specific considerations relevant to each particular field of law, Regan
also incorporated general family policy goals into his analytical model. These pol
icy goals included preserving a reasonable level of certainty about family status;
accommodating the financial needs of dependent partners; accommodating the de-

the safety of family members overrides any competing concerns about privacy in this setting. See
Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence a/Privacy, 23 CONN. 1. REv. 973, 985-94 (1991). See generally
Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence a/Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,45
57 (2000) (describing the role of privacy considerations in the debate surrounding the passage of the
federal Violence Against Women Act).
306 Rickman v. Virginia, 535 S.E.2d 187 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
307 ld. at 191.
308 l d. In Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123 (Ind. 2001), the Indiana Supreme Court applied the
same rule of broad construction to the Indiana "effects of battery statute," which established a bat
tered woman's syndrome defense in criminal proceedings. The court ruled that the statutory term
"former cohabitant" included the defendant, who was charged with the murder of her uncle. Marley,
747 N.E.2d at 1130.
309 At the federal level, the Violence Against Women Act applies to "intimate partner[s]" as
well as spouses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
310 See Regan, supra note 169, at 1449-61. In an earlier proposal forthe legal recognition of
unmarried cohabitation, Professor Grace Ganz Blumberg also focused on the policies and purposes
of particular legal doctrines establishing marital rights vis-ii-vis third parties and the government, to
assess the appropriateness of including unmarried cohabitants within each legal doctrine. See Blum
berg, supra note 1, at 1140-70.
311 Regan evaluated the following marriage laws in this manner, to assess their place in a new
legal status for cohabitants: laws establishing financial claims between spouses upon relationship
termination by divorce or death; laws assigning rights to spouses to make medical decisions for each
other; the Family and Medical Leave Act; laws recognizing limited rights for stepparents vis-ii-vis
their stepchildren; the common law doctrine of necessaries; anti-nepotism provisions; federal tax
laws that benefit spouses; laws extending employment benefits to employees' spouses; the immigra
tion and naturalization laws; laws creating testimonial privileges for spouses; and relational tort
doctrines). See Regan, supra note 169, at 1449-61.
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sire of one partner to care for the other; and assuring that children do not suffer
negative consequences based on their parents' marital status. 312
For example, using this model, Regan concluded that the "privilege for confi
dential communications that is now available to spouses in civil and criminal pro
ceedings,,313 should not be extended to unmarried cohabitants, for two related rea
sons. First, "the number of cohabitors who would attempt to invoke [the privilege1
could be substantial. ... The court would have to conduct an in-depth inquiry into
every unmarried relationship that is asserted as the basis for the privilege.,,314 Here,
the author invoked the general family law policy relating to the costs of uncertainty
arising from the recognition of nonformalized relationships.
Regan's second reason for denying evidentiary privileges to unmarried co
habitants focused on a policy, specific to the law of evidence, which helps to de
fine the scope of all testimonial privileges. Namely, "evidentiary privileges are in
tended to be a narrow exception to the rule that a tribunal should have access to all
relevant information.,,3Is Regan determined that this factor also weighed against
the extension of evidentiary privilege to unmarried cohabitants, because "[m]aking
the communications privilege available to unmarried partners would significantly
expand the body of evidence that potentially could be withheld from the legal sys
tem.,,316
As in Professor Regan's analysis of evidentiary privileges, determinations
about status recognition for unmarried cohabitants usually tum on multiple consid
erations. Often, as in the examples in the fields of torts, domestic violence and evi
dentiary priVileges discussed in this Subsection, relevant considerations emerge
from the particular substantive fields where families are regulated. These matters,
along with the family-related policies that cut across all doctrinal areas oflaw, help
to shape the rules governing the rights and duties of unmarried cohabitants.

F. The Analytical Difficulty Involved In Creating a Comprehensive
Status for Unmarried Cohabitants
An additional factor influencing the development of the law of unmarried co
habitation is the level of difficulty involved in setting the terms of a new family
status relationship for opposite sex couples. There is no clear template available to
lawmakers who might be interested in extending family status recognition in a
comprehensive fashion to opposite sex cohabitants. The process of creating a new
status without such guidance is not a simple matter.
The law of marriage, historically the exclusive status available to the popula
tion of opposite sex couples, provides the frame of reference for most efforts to
formulate a legal definition of unmarried cohabitation. Thus, for example, Chapter
312Id. at 1449-50.
313Id. at 1459.
314Id.
315/d.
316/d.

at 1459-60.
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6 of the ALI's recent Principles ofthe Law ofFamity Dissolution defined the new
status of "domestic partners" by reference to the law of marriage. Under the AU
proposal, domestic partners would have the same economic rights and obligations
inter se as divorcing spouses at the time of relationship dissolution. 317 Those tights
and obligations involve the fair distribution of assets and debts acquired by the
couple, and the possible entitlement of one partner to the compensatory payments
that replace spousal alimony or maintenance under the Principles. 318 Furthermore,
the All proposal expressly declined to assign any other rights or obligations to the
domestic partnership status, and the commentary making this disclaimer refers to
marriage doctrine as a counterpoint. 319
Limiting its consideration in this manner to economic consequences between
the partners at the time of relationship dissolution was logical, in light of the gen
eral scope of the AU project. The limitation dramatically simplified the task of the
ALI. 320 Formulating a more comprehensive definition of unmarried cohabitation,
which would address additional legal issues between the partners and their rights
and obligations vis-a.-vis third parties and the government, would be a more diffi
cult undertaking. Here again, the law of marriage would serve as the logical start
21
ing point.3 Marriage law assigns status recognition to married couples in spheres
of public and private activity where family relationships matter. The process of
defining a new status, then, would involve deciding which incidents of marriage
should be carried over into the legal relationship of unmarried cohabitation. Inevi
tably, any resulting definition of a new status for unmarried opposite sex cohabi
tants would create a "marriage-lite" option. 322
The process of defining a new, marriage-lite option would require some prin
cipled method for selecting the consequences of marriage to be included, and re
jecting all others. For example, as described in the last Subsection, Professor Mil
ton C. Regan, Jr. has designed a method for analyzing each legal incident of mar
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, §§ 6.04-6.06.
The topics of property distribution and compensatory payments upon dissolution of mar
riage are covered in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Principles.
319 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.01 cmt. a, al908.
320 In a similar manner, the Maine legislature limited the scope of the state domestic partner
ship law to a single subject matter area. Namely, the law establishes certain rights and obligations
arising under the State probate code. See 2004 Maine Domestic Partnership Law, supra note 151.
321 The law of marriage has also served as the model for status recognition for unmarried co
habitants when the issue of recognition arises in lawsuits involving a single legal right or obligation.
See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
174-75,265-69,284-92, where the claimant requested the same rights as a surviving spouse under
California relational tort doctrines.
322 The term "marriage-lite" was used in this manner by Professor 1. Thomas Oldham in dis
cussing legal status options for unmarried cohabitants. See Oldham, supra note 171, at 1430.
Professor Nicole La Violette has categorized existing domestic partnership systems, in the
United States and other countries, into two categories: the "Marriage Minus" model and the "Blank
Slate Plus" model. In the first category, lawmakers begin with the law of marriage and subtract cer
tain legal consequences in order to arrive at the new status for registered partners. In the "Blank
Slate Plus" category, lawmakers simply select certain consequences from the law of marriage which
together constitute the registered partnership status. See La Violette, supra note 163, at [22-32.
317

318
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riage in light of specified policy considerations, to determine its appropriateness to
a new cohabitation status. J23 Pursuant to this model, the exercise of judgment
would be involved in selecting particular rights and obligations to define a com
prehensive new status for unmarried cohabitants. 324 Even when a principled
method is employed in this manner to determine which incidents of marriage
should be included and which left out, the resulting definition of a new status for
opposite sex cohabitants will surely seem arbitrary to many people. Starting with
marriage as the "complete" status, whatever rights and duties are subtracted in or
der to produce a lesser status will predictably fail to produce the "right model" in
the eyes of many unmarried cohabitants and other observers of the family law sys
tem.
A new status for unmarried, opposite sex cohabitants need not be directly tied
in this manner to the law of marriage. That is, a new set of rights and obligations
could be established for adult partners who do not marry, which do not simply du
plicate the rights of married couples. 325 For example, Professor E. Gary Spitko
formulated a proposal for inheritance rights for unmarried cohabitants, which di
326
verges significantly from the rights of spouses under state intestacy statutes. A
comprehensive definition of unmarried cohabitation could be formulated by simi
larly modifying marriage law in the many legal contexts where couples are regu
lated.
Such a project would require a great deal of effort. Furthermore, while this
approach moves the proposed status for cohabitants out of the shadow of marriage
to some extent, it does not do so completely. First, the same legal issues addressed
in the law of marriage, such as inheritance rights, would be considered and ad
dressed in formulating a new status for cohabitants. Furthermore, any right or obli
gation established for cohabitants, like the inheritance right for cohabitants pro
posed by Professor Spitko, would most likely be less weighty than the correspond
ing right or obligation of spouses. In effect, although the new status would not in
volve the simple application of selected marriage laws to cohabitants, it would still
amount to a "marriage-lite" option, whose comparison to the "complete" law of
marriage would predictably strike some observers as arbitrary.

323 See supra text accompanying notes 310-16 (discussing the method established for selecting
the legal incidents of a new status for unmarried cohabitants in Regan, supra note 169, at 1449-61).
See also Chambers, supra note lSI, at 1352-54 (selecting a limited set of legal consequences to
define the proposed new status of "designated friends").
324Id.
325 See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 148, at 1200 (criticizing provisions in the Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution regarding unmarried cohabitants, because they are "simply imported
wholesale from marriage law rather than tailored to the characteristics of domestic partnerships").
326 See Spitko, supra note 275, at 290-300. Professor Spitko proposed an "accrual approach"
for calculating the surviving cohabitant's share of a deceased partner's intestate estate based on the
duration of the relationship, ranging from eighteen percent after three years to one hundred percent
after fifteen years. Id. By way of contrast. under existing state intestacy laws, a surviving spouse's
share is not affected by the length of marriage. and surviving cohabitants are not heirs of their de
ceased partners.
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Of course, numerous "marriage-lite" models exist, in the domestic partnership
legislation enacted in the United States and elsewhere. In enacting each domestic
partnership law, lawmakers made explicit determinations about including certain
legal benefits and obligations for designated domestic partners, and excluding oth
ers. As described above in Subsection A,327 the resulting laws are far from uniform
in defining the terms of a legal status for unmarried cohabitants. The existence of
domestic partnership laws demonstrate that the goal of recognizing this category of
family relationships can indeed be accomplished. The lack of uniformity in defin
ing a status for opposite sex cohabitants, under the existing partnership laws and in
various proposals for regulation, emphasizes the absence of any clear and dominant
model for defining such a status. As described in this Subsection, establishing a
comprehensive new status, which would function as an alternative to marriage,
involves unique analytical challenges.

G. The Role of Privacy and Autonomy
A final policy consideration shaping the legal regulation of cohabiting rela
tionships focuses on the issue of autonomy for those couples who choose not to
marry. The basic issue raised here is whether two adults should be permitted to
establish a de facto family relationship without incurring legal consequences, that
is, without having a legal status imposed upon them by the state. On the one hand,
the right to be free from state regulation of their intimate relationships may be a
priority for some couples who choose not to marry, or at least for one of the part
328
ners. On the other hand, it is inaccurate to attribute such a desire to all cohabit
ing couples, and distinguishing between the two categories of unmarried couples
330
329
may be difficult. Furthermore, deference to the autonomy of the parties may
run afoul of the state's interest in protecting dependent family members in de facto
family settings and, in some cases, the expectations of third parties.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 149-55 (describing the rights and obligations of part
ners under domestic partnership laws).
328 See Forder, supra note 164, at 380-81 (documenting the argument made by critics of cer
tain European laws "against binding couples into a fOlmal cohabitation relationship by operation of
law when they have manifestly opted not to marry").
329 See generally Forste, supra note 193, at 92 ("summariz(ing] the social science research on
cohabitation during the past decade," which reveals great diversity among cohabiting couples). See
generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, It All Depends on What You Mean by Home: Toward a
Communitarian Theory ofthe "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAHL. REv. 569, 580 (asking, "(d]o
nontraditional families want autonomy from law or autonomy under law?").
330 The meaning of "privacy" and "autonomy" in family law contexts is not always clear. For
example, Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr. observed that the privacy principle could be relied upon to
support the extensive regulation of unmarried cohabitation, in the following manner:
An alternative argument for institutionalization is that respect for individual privacy and
autonomy mandates that the state not favor any particular form of intimate relationship
above others. If marriage is losing favor because it meets the needs of fewer people,
then the state should not try artificially to prop it up by creating incenti ves for partners
to enter into an arrangement that they otherwise would not choose.
Regan, supra note 169, at 1437-38.
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The threshold question arises whether a couple's decision not to marry con
veys useful information to lawmakers about the couple's desires regarding legal
regulation. On the one hand, a couple's decision not to marry can be viewed as a
mutual strategy to avoid state-imposed, marriage-like legal consequences in the
context of an intimate, cohabiting relationship. In the current legal environment,
cohabiting couples are free to establish economic rights inter se by executing a
contract. Professor David Westfall has emphasized the importance of protecting
the autonomy of couples who desire no additional state regulation. According to
Westfall:
[S]ome cohabitants do not feel free to leave an unsatisfactory rela
tionship or to seek by bargaining to improve it. But surely there are
others who are not similarly inhibited and who express their dissatis
faction with a relationship either by bargaining or by moving on to
another partner. .. Thus, the question for policymakers is whether
protection of the interests of cohabitants in the first group is more
important than freeing other cohabitants to structure their relation
ship to meet their individual needs. 331
Westfall stated his clear preference for protecting the category of contracting co
habitants, when he criticized the recent ALI proposal to assign property and sup
port rights to cohabitants at the time of relationship dissolution. According to
Westfall, "[i]nstead of ... facilitating enforcement of agreements between non
marital partners, the Principles march resolutely backward to status-based law.',332
By way of contrast, the proponents of status recognition do not read the same
desire for nonregulation into the decisions of couples to cohabit. This point of view
was expressed by Professor Grace Ganz Blumberg, as follows:
[A]s the incidence of cohabitation has dramatically increased and
cohabitation has become socially acceptable at all levels of society,
it has become increasingly implausible to attribute special signifi
cance to the parties' failure to marry.... When cohabitation be
comes well established as a social institution, people do not choose
to cohabit rather than marry. They simply cohabit,333
Current U.S. law is largely consistent with the assumption that an eligible
couple's decision not to marry implies a desire to avoid legal regulation. In most
33lWestfall, supra note 143, at 1478.
at 1479. See also id. at 1476-77 (summarizing the viewpoints of other scholars who pre
fer a contract approach to defining the rights of unmarried cohabitants inter se). Some critics have
identified gender bias as a moti vating factor in proposals to reject contract as the exclusive basis for
cohabitants' rights. Oldham, supra note 171, at 1427 (citations omitted) ("Some have argued that
creating status-like rights for cohabitants who have not jointly elected the status is paternalistic and
sexist, in that it is actually intended to provide protection for women who are assumed to be unable
on their own to protect themselves legally.").
333B!umberg, supra note 133, at 1296 (citations omitted).
332Id.
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states, unmarried couples have no legal consequences imposed upon them by vir
tue of their cohabiting relationship. Within this legal framework, a couple can es
tablish economic rights and duties between themselves, which the law will enforce,
334
by executing a private contract. Furthermore, domestic partnership laws recog
nize and assign legal consequences only to couples who act to formally register as
335
domestic partners. The withholding of legal recognition in the absence of a pri
vate contract or formal registration is consistent with an assumption that decisions
not to marry or otherwise formalize a cohabiting relationship involve a desire to be
free of state regulation. Of course, the current rules of law are also premised on
additional policy considerations relating to morality, the preservation of marriage,
and certainty in the law, discussed elsewhere in this Article.
The issue of personal autonomy and the concern for private intentions inevi
tably receive less deference in the context of state-regulated family status relation
ships. By definition, many family status consequences are imposed by the legal
system without regard for the intentions of the family members. As described ear
lier in Subsection A, the goals of such regulation include the protection of individ
ual family members, support for the family unit, and the vindication of state inter
ests relating to stable families?36 Often, the laws designed to accomplish these
goals ignore the desires or intentions of individual family members. The law of
marriage is instructive on this point.
The state-imposed marriage status involves numerous legal consequences.
Married couples are limited in their ability to modify by contract the terms of this
status. First, as to the numerous aspects of marriage law that involve third parties,
in areas such as criminal law, tort law, taxation, and government benefits, the mar
ried couple's private contract cannot affect the rights of others. For example, to the
extent that the law confers a right on creditors in some circumstances to collect one
spouse's debt from the other partner,337 the spouses cannot agree between them
selves to defeat such creditors' rights. Furthermore, even as to the aspects of mar
riage law that affect only the spouses, such as their economic rights inter se at the
time of divorce, the power to change the terms of their marriage status is not
unlimited. Thus, state laws impose significant limitations on the contractual free
dom of the parties, under doctrines governing the enforceability of premarital and
marital contracts. 338 The limitations are premised on the same policies relating to

334See supra text accompanying notes 140-44 (discussing state laws governing the enforce
ment of contracts between unmarried cohabitants).
335See supra text accompanying notes 149-57,206-07,259-64 (discussing various aspects of
domestic partnership laws).
336See supra text accompanying notes 133-36 (discussing the nature of status relationships in
the law).
337 See. e.g., GREGORYET AL., supra note 133, § 3.10 (discussing the common law doctrine of
necessaries).
338 See 5 FAM. L. & PRAC., supra note 143, §§ 59.04-06; Developments in the Law, Marriage
as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future ofAntenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 2075, 2082-87 (2003). See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra
note 6, ch. 7 (proposing model rules to govern the enforceability of premarital agreements).
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protection for dependent family members that also form the basis for the underly
ing marriage status. 339
A corresponding set of limitations on the autonomy of couples to order their
own relationships would likely accompany the creation of a legal family status for
unmarried cohabitants. Thus, for example, the ALI proposal to extend property
rights to cohabitants at the time of relationship dissolution, in Chapter 6 of The
Principles of the Law of Famity Dissolution, establishes the right of cohabiting
couples to contract out of these status-based rights. 340 The ALI proposal also limits
the enforceability of such private contracts, pursuant to standards governing the
enforceability of contracts between spouses regarding the same matters. 341
A future decision by lawmakers to create a comprehensive new family status
for unmarried cohabitants would be premised on the many considerations dis
cussed in this Article. In the current legal setting, where unmarried cohabitation is
largely unregulated in the law, the question arises whether greater state regulation
would be widely regarded by cohabiting couples as an unwelcome loss of auton
omy. There is no certain answer to this question, but the understanding that cohabi
tants generally "want their freedom" supports the state posture of nonregulation.
Ultimately, however, a decision by lawmakers to create a new status for unmarried
cohabitants would reflect a belief that the basic purposes of the family law system
are best achieved by assigning legal consequences to established family relation
ships. Within this framework of analysis, the goals of identifying and protecting
private intentions would become a less significant consideration.
CONCLUSION

The final decades of the twentieth century were a time of tremendous change
in the structure of U.S. families. This trend promises to continue as the new mil
lennium unfolds. The private decisions of many adults to establish family struc
tures outside the traditional nuclear family format have raised compelling questions
about the legal recognition and regulation of so-called nontraditional families.
Many U.S. families today are headed by unmarried, opposite sex couples. By and
large, the relationships established between unmarried cohabitants have received
little recognition in the family law system. This Article explored various forces that
have shaped this legal result.
The question of legal recognition for unmarried couples became the focus of
public attention following the 1976 California Supreme Court case of Marvin v.
Marvin?43 Since that time, the proponents of status treatment for cohabitants have
identified significant costs associated with the continuing nonrecognition of de
facto family relationships. The regulation of families occurs in legal fields as di
vergent as tort law, criminal law, tax law, property law and public benefit pro
339 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 133. § 4.03[A).
340See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 6, § 6.01.
34lSee id. § 6.01(2).
343 Marvin

v. Marvin. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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grams. This extensive regulation is intended to protect individual family members,
strengthen the family unit, and promote the public interest in stable families. Ac
cording to the proponents of reform, limiting the definition of "family" in the law
to the traditional nuclear family leaves these important purposes unaccomplished
as to many modern families, including those headed by unmarried couples.
By and large, the legal system has failed to respond to these calls for reform.
Several distinct forces have retarded the development of a comprehensive legal
status for unmarried, opposite sex cohabitants. Certain rationales, which help to
explain the continuing disregard in the law for unmarried cohabitants, apply
broadly to other nonformalized family relationships as well. For example, the prin
ciple that family status should be a matter easy to identify and prove counsels
against the recognition of family relationships formed between adults outside of
marriage, and formed between adults and children outside the setting of biological
or adoptive parenthood. Most marriages and most biological and adoptive parent
child relationships are readily established through public records or blood testing.
By way of contrast, significant family relationships created by a course of conduct
are more difficult to identify. This consideration has provided support for the con
tinuing disregard in the law for unmarried partnerships, outside of formal domestic
partnership registration systems.
Other relevant policy considerations are unique to the particular category of
family relationships established between unmarried cohabitants. For example, the
historical view that sex outside of marriage and unmarried cohabitation were im
moral resulted in both the criminal regulation of cohabitants and the refusal to ex
tend positive status recognition to their relationships. Although morality-based
considerations are constitutionally suspect in the modern context, they continue to
playa role in shaping the law of cohabitation for opposite sex couples.
The most compelling set of policy considerations shaping the law for opposite
sex cohabitants focuses on the venerable institution of marriage. Because most of
these couples are eligible to marry each other, status recognition for unmarried co
habitation has been assessed by policymakers and lawmakers in terms of its likely
impact on marriage. Thus, family law analysts have often assumed that the recogni
tion of an alternative status for marriage-eligible adults would send a message that
marriage has become less important in U.S. society. They also fear that the creation
of a legally significant alternative would channel couples away from marriage deci
sions. According to this viewpoint, the predicted impact on the institution of mar
riage justifies the decisions of lawmakers not to recognize unmarried cohabitation
as an alternative legal status.
The fact that unmarried cohabitation would exist as an alternative status for
marriage-eligible couples has given rise to additional concerns. First, the formula
tion of a new status would take place against the substantive backdrop of marriage
law, and the practical question would arise: What parts of marriage law, or varia
tions thereon, should be included in the law regulating unmarried cohabitation?
The analytical complexity involved in fully considering this question has likely
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contributed to the dearth of proposals for the creation of a comprehensive status for
unmarried cohabitants.
And finally, the fact that cohabiting relationships between opposite sex co
habitants talce place against the backdrop of marriage eligibility has fueled a spe
cial concern about the autonomy of unmarried couples. lt is possible to view a mar
riage-eligible couple's decision not to marry as expressing the preference of one or
both partners to be free of state regulation. Of course, this factual assumption about
the preferences of unmarried couples is subject to challenge in the case of many
cohabitants. Furthermore, and more importantly, the extent to which family rela
tionships are regulated in the law is not generally determined by the wishes offam
ily members. Nevertheless, the privacy factor continues to influence discussions
about the appropriate posture of the law toward couples who elect not to get mar
ried.
Thus, various marriage-related considerations have influenced the formulation
oflaws governing unmarried, opposite sex cohabitation. Until recently, questions
about the legal recognition and regulation of same sex unmarried couples did not
raise these same marriage-related concerns. However, the current movement in the
law toward marriage eligibility for same sex partners may ultimately eliminate the
distinction between opposite sex couples and same sex couples for these analytical
purposes. In the future, large numbers of couples in the United States will be
choosing between marriage and unmarried cohabitation. The issue of legal recogni
tion and regulation for couples who opt for unmarried cohabitation will remain an
important part of the discourse about family law for the new millennium. This Ar
ticle identified and analyzed many of the likely points of discussion in the unfold
ing debates about legal recognition and regulation for marriage-eligible cohabi
tants.

